AnB

An MCP server front-end for AnB that lets AI agents use secrets without ever seeing them.

Headline guarantee: even a fully prompt-injected agent, calling every tool in every way, cannot extract a raw key. No tool returns a plaintext secret; reveal paths require a TTY that this server does not have, so alice refuses them.

Unlike a naive "secrets MCP" that hands the key to the model, here the agent gets placeholders and outcomes — the plaintext stays behind the anb-mcp → alice → Bob boundary.

How it works

Agent (untrusted) ──MCP/stdio──► anb-mcp ──exec──► alice ──mTLS──► Bob ──► master key
                                  (this repo)      (AnB client)   (AnB KMS daemon)

anb-mcp runs as a dedicated, narrowly-scoped AnB identity (not your operator CLI identity), so a compromised agent's blast radius is limited to what Bob authorizes for that identity.

Tools

Tool	Does	Returns
anb_list	List secret keys this identity may reference	names + metadata, no values
anb_exec	Run an operator-allowlisted command with secrets injected into the child's env	exit code + redacted stdout/stderr
anb_status	Health / authz self-check	Bob reachability, identity, authorized prefixes, rule count
anb_redact	Scrub text — secret values + high-entropy tokens → <agent-vault:key>	redacted text
anb_render_to_file	Render a placeholder template, write a 0600 file under the render dir	the path, never the content

Never exposed: any reveal / get-plaintext / shell tool.

Prerequisites

This is a thin front-end; it depends on AnB. For v0.1 you need:

1. A working alice + bob (AnB) on the host.
2. A dedicated MCP identity enrolled with Bob, scoped to only the key prefixes the agent should use. Point the server at it via ANB_MCP_ALICE_DIR (default ~/.anb/alice-mcp). Do not reuse your operator identity.
3. Exec allowlist with scope tags — alice's exec rules carry a 4th scope column; only rules tagged mcp apply to this surface (default-deny). Tag a rule for the agent by appending mcp (e.g. ^/opt/.../curl ...$\tOPENAI_KEY\t# call\tmcp). (Requires AnB with alice exec --surface, alice redact, and alice status --json — all shipped.)

Build

go mod tidy
go build -o anb-mcp .

Register with Claude Code

claude mcp add -s user -e ANB_MCP_ALICE_DIR=$HOME/.anb/alice-mcp \
  anb -- /path/to/anb-mcp

Or in ~/.claude.json under mcpServers:

{
  "mcpServers": {
    "anb": {
      "command": "/path/to/anb-mcp",
      "env": { "ANB_MCP_ALICE_DIR": "/Users/you/.anb/alice-mcp" }
    }
  }
}

Tools surface as mcp__anb__anb_list, mcp__anb__anb_exec, mcp__anb__anb_status.

Status

v0.1 — done, verified end-to-end (and by a real agent). All three tools work against a live Bob: anb_status returns real KMS state; anb_exec runs allowlisted commands and denies the rest; and a secret injected via --env <agent-vault:key> is used by the child process while the caller receives only the redacted placeholder — the plaintext never reaches the agent. Confirmed both by go-sdk-client invariant tests (test/) and by an independent Claude Code session calling the tools over MCP. See CHANGELOG.md.

Roadmap: see PLAN.md. (v0.2 adds anb_render_to_file + a dedicated anb_redact tool; v0.3 lowers per-call latency and adds per-agent ephemeral, short-TTL scoped credentials — while keeping alice as a separate process, so the no-reveal guarantee stays structural, not a code-discipline promise.)

License

MIT