DevVault

Your AI can use your secrets. It can never read them.

DevVault is a local-first secrets vault that any MCP-aware client (Claude Desktop, Claude Code, Cursor, VS Code) can talk to. The AI assistant can store, list, rotate, and operate your secrets — but the plaintext values never enter the model's context, so a prompt-injection attack has nothing to steal.

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The problem

AI agents now touch real infrastructure — they deploy, call APIs, run migrations. That means they need credentials. Today you have three bad options:

1. Paste the key into chat — it's now in a transcript, a log, maybe a training set.
2. Leave it in .env — plaintext on disk, one git add . away from a public repo.
3. Use an existing MCP vault — better, but they expose a getSecret tool that drops the plaintext into the model's context. The OWASP MCP Top 10 lists prompt injection as the #1 threat: a hidden instruction in a web page or README that the agent obeys. If the agent can read the secret, an injection can make it leak the secret.

DevVault removes the agent's ability to read the secret in the first place.

Analogy: a hotel safe where the bellhop (the AI) can carry the locked box to your room and use what's inside on your behalf — but can never open it. The combination stays with you.

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How it works

MCP Client (Claude, Cursor)
        │   sees: names, metadata, exit codes, REDACTED output
        │   never sees: plaintext secret values
        ▼
DevVault MCP Server  ──►  Crypto core (AES-256-GCM, one IV per secret)
        │                       │ master key
        ▼                       ▼
Child process  ◄── secrets    OS keychain  (or passphrase fallback)
(npm deploy,      injected as
 curl, etc.)      env vars

The one line that is the whole product: plaintext flows from the crypto core into the child process's environment, and never travels back up to the AI.

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The tools

Tool	Can the AI see the value?	Notes
storeSecret	No (write-only)	Confirms by name; value never echoed.
listSecrets	No (metadata only)	Names, project, timestamps.
rotateSecret	No (write-only)	Replaces a value in place.
deleteSecret	No	Soft-delete (recoverable).
runWithSecrets	No — injected into child env	Returns exit code + redacted stdout/stderr. This is the headline feature.
getSecret	Yes — escape hatch	Off by default. Only registers if you set allowPlaintextReads: true. Audited.

Every call is recorded in a hash-chained, tamper-evident audit log (names + outcomes — never values).

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Install

npx devvault-mcp

Connect to Claude Desktop

Add to your Claude Desktop MCP config (claude_desktop_config.json):

{
  "mcpServers": {
    "devvault": {
      "command": "npx",
      "args": ["-y", "devvault-mcp"]
    }
  }
}

Restart Claude Desktop. The DevVault tools will appear. Try: "Store my Stripe test key as STRIPE_KEY, then list my secrets."

Master key

On macOS / Windows / Linux with a desktop keychain, DevVault stores its master key there automatically. In headless environments (CI, containers) set a passphrase instead:

export DEVVAULT_PASSPHRASE="a-long-random-passphrase"

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Security model (the short version)

1. The model is an untrusted operator. Every tool assumes the AI's context may be hijacked at any moment.
2. Plaintext has exactly one exit, and it isn't the model — the environment of a child process you asked to run.
3. Tools are risk-tiered. Safe tools never return values. getSecret is off by default. deleteSecret is soft + recoverable.
4. Every access is on the record — hash-chained audit log; alter one entry and the chain visibly breaks.
5. Fail closed. Wrong key, tampered data, unknown secret, corrupt vault → error, never a partial or plaintext fallback.

Note on concurrency: writes are serialized with an in-process lock so parallel calls can't clobber the vault file. DevVault does not impose ordering between two independent concurrent tool calls — an MCP client should await each tool's result before issuing the next (which is how the model behaves normally).

Crypto disclaimer: the encryption uses only Node's built-in crypto (no hand-rolled primitives), but this code has not yet had an independent security review. Do not rely on it for high-value production secrets until that review is done (see the launch brief).

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Configuration

Env var	Purpose	Default
DEVVAULT_PATH	Vault file location	~/.devvault/vault.enc
DEVVAULT_PASSPHRASE	Master key fallback when no OS keychain	(none — keychain used)
DEVVAULT_AUDIT	Audit log location	~/.devvault/audit.log
DEVVAULT_CONFIG	Config file location	~/.devvault/config.json

To enable the getSecret escape hatch, create ~/.devvault/config.json:

{ "allowPlaintextReads": true }

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Development

npm install
npm test     # 19 tests incl. tamper, wrong-key, redaction, no-leak, concurrency
npm run build

License

Apache-2.0. The free local vault is open source — that's the distribution engine, not lost revenue. Paid collaboration (encrypted team sync, audit export, policy) is the roadmap.