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Proof-of-Time temporal attestation for AI agents. 4 HTTPS sources, 54K+ proofs. Claude Desktop compatible.
Proof-of-Time temporal attestation for AI agents. 4 HTTPS sources, 54K+ proofs. Claude Desktop compatible.
Reference implementation of draft-helmprotocol-tttps (IETF Experimental)
MCP Server for OpenTTT — Proof of Time tools for AI agents
Every Claude Code long-horizon workflow hits the same wall: context compression erases action history.
Agent B has no memory of what Agent A decided. Agent A resumes after compression with no record of its own prior steps. Duplicate work. Lost decisions. State corruption.
ttt-mcp is the external causal chain that survives context compression.
Every workflow step is anchored to a cryptographic timestamp on an external server — physically separate from Claude's context window. When compression happens, agents call pot_query(eventId) for O(1) exact step recall and resume with full causal context.
Claude workflow → [context compressed] → agents call pot_query(eventId)
→ external server returns full timeline
→ workflow resumes, zero lost state
| Layer | Mechanism | Guarantee |
|---|---|---|
| Identity | SHA-3 eventId (256-bit) | Collision probability 2⁻²⁵⁶ — practically zero |
| Lookup | O(1) exact retrieval | No context consumed by history reconstruction |
| Ordering | TTTPS causal timestamps | Total order on events — tamper-proof sequence proof |
| Causal chain | prevEventId DAG | O(depth) traversal — depth ~100 for 1B-token workflows |
| Non-repudiation | Ed25519 signature | Cryptographic proof of who acted when |
| Resilience | Erasure-coded cryptographic shards | ≥97% recovery at BER=0.05, 99.88% at BER=0.02 (theoretical) |
| Persistence | Redis AOF + 90-day TTL | Server survives context compression and restarts |
claude mcp add ttt -- npx -y @helm-protocol/[email protected]
With an API key (raises the free limit to your plan's monthly quota):
claude mcp add ttt -e TTT_API_KEY=your-key -- npx -y @helm-protocol/[email protected]
Add to claude_desktop_config.json:
{
"mcpServers": {
"ttt": {
"command": "npx",
"args": ["-y", "@helm-protocol/[email protected]"],
"env": { "TTT_API_KEY": "your-key" }
}
}
}
One-click install, or add the same mcpServers block above to .cursor/mcp.json.
Free tier: 100 calls/day per IP — no signup needed.
Once connected, run this sequence in Claude:
Step 1 — Stamp a workflow step:
Just tell Claude naturally:
"Stamp this step as my-first-step" "Record what I just did as refactor-auth-step1"
Claude calls pot_generate automatically. Or call it directly:
pot_generate(eventId: "my-first-step")
Step 2 — Simulate context compression: start a new Claude session
Step 3 — Recover in the new session:
Tell Claude:
"What did I do in my-first-step?" "Recover my last workflow state"
Or call directly:
pot_query(eventId: "my-first-step")
→ Returns exact record. Amnesia gone.
Step 4 — Build a causal chain:
pot_generate(eventId: "step-2", prevEventId: "my-first-step")
pot_graph(eventId: "step-2", depth: 5)
→ Full backward chain. Cryptographically ordered.
| Tool | Purpose |
|---|---|
pot_generate |
Stamp a workflow step with a cryptographic timestamp |
pot_verify |
Verify a PoT signature |
pot_query |
O(1) exact lookup by eventId — core amnesia recovery |
pot_graph |
Traverse causal DAG (backward + forward chain) |
pot_checkpoint |
Roll up events into a compressed summary — use every ~100 events or before long tasks |
pot_stats |
Server statistics and mode status |
pot_health |
Health check |
Stamp a workflow step with a cryptographic timestamp. For Claude Code: use eventId + prevEventId. For DeFi: use txHash + chainId + poolAddress. One of eventId or txHash is required.
| Parameter | Type | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| eventId | string | Either/or | Workflow step identifier. E.g. "refactor_auth_step1" |
| prevEventId | string | No | Previous step's eventId — links steps into a causal chain |
| txHash | string | Either/or | Transaction hash (DeFi, hex with 0x prefix) |
| chainId | number | No | EVM chain ID (DeFi) |
| poolAddress | string | No | DEX pool contract address (DeFi) |
Query Proof of Time records. Use eventId for O(1) exact lookup after context compression.
| Parameter | Type | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| eventId | string | No | Exact step lookup — collision probability 2⁻²⁵⁶ |
| startTime | number | No | Start time (unix ms). Default: 24h ago |
| endTime | number | No | End time (unix ms). Default: now |
| limit | number | No | Max entries to return. Default: 100, max: 1000 |
Traverse the causal chain from any step. Returns backward chain (ancestors) and forward chain (descendants).
| Parameter | Type | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| eventId | string | Yes | Step to traverse from |
| depth | number | No | Max backward depth. Default: 10, max: 100 |
Returns:
backwardChain — ancestors in chronological order (depth-compressed for large chains)forwardChain — steps that follow the given eventIdchainBroken — true if a gap is detected (ancestor was evicted from ring buffer, or the chain root references an unknown entry)brokenAt — "server_restart" if the gap was caused by a server restart clearing in-memory state; otherwise the eventId at which the break occurred; null if chain is intactreachableDepth — number of ancestors successfully traversed before the gap (or chain root)Causal chain gap causes:
server_restart: the server restarted and the in-memory DAG was cleared. If Redis is available and REDIS_URL is set, the DAG is rebuilt from Redis on startup — reducing restart gaps.chainBroken: true with brokenAt set to the oldest reachable eventId.Recovering from a gap: call pot_checkpoint before long tasks to compress and preserve the chain within the token budget, or use Redis persistence to survive restarts.
| Parameter | Type | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| potHash | string | Yes | PoT hash to verify (hex with 0x prefix) |
| grgShards | string[] | Yes | Array of hex-encoded cryptographic integrity shards |
| chainId | number | Yes | EVM chain ID |
| poolAddress | string | Yes | Uniswap V4 pool address |
| Parameter | Type | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| period | "day" | "week" | "month" |
Yes | Time period for statistics |
No parameters.
Creates a compressed rollup checkpoint of workflow history.
Use when: Approaching context limit, before long tasks, or every ~100 events.
| Parameter | Type | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| fromEventId | string | No | Start of range — first eventId in the causal chain to include |
| toEventId | string | No | End of range — last eventId in the causal chain to include |
| startTime | number | No | Unix ms. Default: 1 hour ago |
| endTime | number | No | Unix ms. Default: now |
| maxTokens | number | No | Approximate max tokens for rollup output. Default: 2000 |
Returns:
checkpointId — unique checkpoint identifierrollup — compressed event history (depth-adaptive: full/compact/minimal/rollup)summary — human-readable one-line summary of the checkpointchainIntact — whether the causal chain is unbrokennextCheckpointHint — recommended events before next checkpointDepth-adaptive compression:
| Depth | Format | ~Tokens |
|---|---|---|
| 1–5 | Full entry | ~200/event |
| 6–20 | Compact (id+hash+ts) | ~80/event |
| 21–50 | Minimal (id+ts) | ~30/event |
| 51+ | Rollup string | ~10/event |
Problem: A 20-agent Dynamic Workflow refactors a 500K-line codebase over hours. After each context compression, agents have no memory of what they already processed. Duplicate work. State corruption.
Solution: Each agent stamps its steps with pot_generate(eventId, prevEventId). After compression, it calls pot_query(eventId) to recover its exact action history — what ran, when, in what order — from the external server. The server is outside Claude's context window; compression never touches it.
// Agent starts a workflow step
const pot = await client.callTool({
name: "pot_generate",
arguments: {
eventId: "refactor_auth_module_step3",
prevEventId: "refactor_auth_module_step2"
}
});
// pot.potHash — cryptographic proof this step happened at this time
// After context compression, agent recovers its history:
const history = await client.callTool({
name: "pot_query",
arguments: { eventId: "refactor_auth_module_step3" }
});
// history.local[0] — exact record: timestamp, prevEventId, potHash
// history.found: true — O(1) lookup, collision probability 2⁻²⁵⁶
// Traverse full causal chain:
const chain = await client.callTool({
name: "pot_graph",
arguments: { eventId: "refactor_auth_module_step3", depth: 20 }
});
// chain.backwardChain — all ancestor steps in chronological order
// chain.forwardChain — steps that follow this one
// chain.chainBroken — true if a gap was detected in the ancestor chain
// chain.brokenAt — "server_restart" if the server restarted and cleared
// the in-memory DAG; otherwise the eventId of the oldest
// reachable ancestor before the gap; null if chain intact
// chain.reachableDepth — how many ancestors were recovered before the gap
// Handle a server-restart gap:
if (chain.chainBroken && chain.brokenAt === "server_restart") {
// Server cleared in-memory state; ancestors before the gap are gone unless
// Redis was configured (REDIS_URL) — in that case the DAG was rebuilt on
// restart and chainBroken will be false.
// Recover by querying the most recent checkpoint or restarting from a known step.
}
Before a long task or every ~100 events — create a checkpoint:
// Compress workflow history before context fills up — by causal range:
const checkpoint = await client.callTool({
name: "pot_checkpoint",
arguments: {
fromEventId: "refactor_auth_module_step1",
toEventId: "refactor_auth_module_step3"
}
});
// checkpoint.checkpointId — store this; resume from it after compression
// checkpoint.rollup — depth-adaptive compressed history (10–200 tokens/event)
// checkpoint.chainIntact: true — causal chain verified unbroken
// checkpoint.nextCheckpointHint: 87 — suggested events before next checkpoint
// Or compress by time window with a token budget:
const checkpoint = await client.callTool({
name: "pot_checkpoint",
arguments: {
startTime: Date.now() - 3_600_000, // last 1 hour
maxTokens: 1500
}
});
// After context compression, restore from checkpoint instead of re-querying all events:
const history = await client.callTool({
name: "pot_query",
arguments: { eventId: checkpoint.checkpointId }
});
// Full causal context restored in a single call
Outcome: Zero duplicate work. Full workflow timeline recoverable even after complete context resets.
Problem: You got front-run. You can't prove it — mempool timestamps are per-node, unsigned, non-authoritative.
Solution: Call pot_generate before every submission. The PoT receipt is cryptographically signed using three independent time sources (NIST, Google, Cloudflare). The on-chain hash can be anchored via a separate Base Sepolia TTT ERC-1155 contract. If front-running occurs, you have a timestamped record predating the attacker's block inclusion.
const pot = await client.callTool({
name: "pot_generate",
arguments: { txHash: pendingTxHash, chainId: 8453, poolAddress: "0x..." }
});
// pot.potHash — your evidence, timestamped by NIST+Google+Cloudflare
Note: The DeFi path (
txHash+chainId+poolAddress) requires a server-side build with the integrity-shard pipeline enabled. It is not available in the publicopentttnpm package; calls without it will throw. The Claude Code path (eventId) works out of the box.
Solution: Integrate TTTHookSimple (Uniswap V4 hook, Base Sepolia: 0x8C633b05b833a476925F7d9818da6E215760F2c7). Honest builders get turbo mode. Tampered sequences get full mode (penalty delay). Economics, not governance.
Note: Shard-based verification (
pot_verifywithgrgShards) requires a server-side build with the integrity-shard pipeline enabled — not available in the publicopentttnpm package.
Problem: MiFIR Article 22c / RTS 25 requires microsecond-precision UTC-synchronized timestamps. Hardware PTP appliances cost $50K–$500K.
Solution: pot_generate produces an Ed25519-signed timestamp with an uncertainty bound and multi-source attestation. Structurally compatible with the RTS 25 audit record format. One API call per trade.
const audit = await client.callTool({
name: "pot_generate",
arguments: { txHash: tradeHash, chainId: 8453 }
});
// audit.timestamp: high-resolution timestamp
// audit.uncertainty: ± bound (RTS 25 uncertainty field)
// audit.confidence: fraction of sources that agreed
Precision note: The default network time sources (Roughtime / NTP) provide a few-millisecond uncertainty bound. The MiFIR Art. 22c / RTS 25 ±1ms (and tighter) requirement is met only with an added GEO time source (KTSat); this is a roadmap configuration, not the default deployment.
Outcome: Structurally compatible audit trail. IETF specification: draft-helmprotocol-tttps.
Problem: When multiple AI agents interact in a pipeline, the causal order matters for debugging and audit. Agent logs are unverifiable.
Solution: Each agent stamps its action with pot_generate. The potHash chain is independently verifiable. pot_graph reconstructs who did what and in what order.
| Tool | Integration | What it recalls | Integrity | Hot-path cost |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Letta (MemGPT) | owns the agent loop | self-editing semantic memory | none | embedding + vector search per memory op |
| LangGraph / LangMem | LangGraph only | graph state / semantic | none | checkpoint I/O (+ embeddings) |
| RAG / vector DB | bolt-on | fuzzy similarity | none | embed + vector search per item |
| ttt-mcp | 2-min MCP retrofit | exact causal step (by eventId) | Ed25519 + TTTPS timestamp | sign + hash + write — 0 embedding calls |
The cost difference is structural, not incidental.
Letta and Mem0 treat agent memory as a semantic search problem — every recall forces an LLM embedding call and a vector search. ttt-mcp bypasses the LLM/embedding layer entirely: state recovery is an O(1) cryptographic hash lookup. Marginal cost is commodity CPU + storage, not API tokens.
Scope: agents stamp the steps worth checkpointing — not every token, not every query. Volume tracks decisions, not total chat traffic.
If you need fuzzy semantic search over past conversations, use Letta or a vector DB. If you need a zero-embedding, deterministic state recovery layer for long-horizon workflows that survives context compaction, use ttt-mcp.
| Tier | Price | Calls/month |
|---|---|---|
| Free | $0 | 100/day per IP — no signup |
| Dev | $29/mo | 100K |
| Pro | $99/mo | 1M |
| Team | $299/mo | 10M + $0.01/1K overage |
| Enterprise | $999+/mo | 100M calls/mo · $0.001/1K overage · SLA 99.9% |
| Platform License | Negotiated ($2M+/yr) | Volume cap negotiated · native integration |
Subscribe:
Dev $29/mo · Pro $99/mo · Team $299/mo — to subscribe, email [email protected].
Enterprise & Platform License: [email protected]
Contact: [email protected]
Quota mechanics — stdio vs HTTP:
PORT set): the per-IP free tier limit (100 calls/day) is enforced locally in the server process.npx, Claude Desktop): there is no per-IP counter. Tool calls are delegated to api.kenosian.com via X-TTT-API-Key; quota is enforced server-side against your plan's monthly allowance. Without TTT_API_KEY the local fallback runs with no daily cap, but plan features (server-side DAG persistence, multi-session causal chains) are unavailable.Time source tiers (automatic fallback):
| Tier | Source | Stratum | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 (preferred) | PTP / hardware clock | 0–1 | Requires local PTP daemon |
| 2 | Roughtime / NTP (NIST, Google, Cloudflare) | 2–4 | Default for most deployments |
| 3 (offline fallback) | Local system clock | 16 | RFC 5905 unsynchronized stratum — used when all network sources are unreachable |
The server falls through to stratum 16 automatically; no manual configuration needed. The stratum field in every pot_generate response indicates which tier was used.
Redis persistence (optional):
Redis is not required. The in-memory DAG is authoritative at runtime. If REDIS_URL is set, events are written to Redis with a 90-day TTL and the DAG is rebuilt from Redis on server restart — reducing server_restart chain gaps. Without Redis, the in-memory DAG is cleared on restart.
Cold Start warm-up — On first startup, BatchSigner requires one request to initialize. Call pot_health or send a single dummy pot_generate before your load balancer health check goes live. Without this, the first request may see p99 ~500ms; subsequent requests stabilize to <10ms.
# Kubernetes / Docker: add to your startup script
curl -s http://your-server/pot/health > /dev/null
BSL-1.1 — free for non-commercial use.
Commercial use (production bots, hedge funds, prop desks) requires a license.
Change Date: 2029-05-28 → Apache 2.0
Run in your terminal:
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