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The Execution Security Layer for the Agentic Era. Providing deterministic "Sudo" governance and audit logs for autonomous AI agents.
The Execution Security Layer for the Agentic Era. Providing deterministic "Sudo" governance and audit logs for autonomous AI agents.
Every command your AI agent runs, reviewed before it runs.
Node9 sits between your AI agent and your system. Every shell command, file write, database query, and MCP tool call passes through Node9 first — blocked, reviewed, or logged based on your policy. Works with Claude Code, Gemini CLI, Cursor, Codex, and any MCP server.
git push --force, rm -rf /, curl|bash, DROP TABLE, ...) before they runnpx node9-ai scan
Reads your existing Claude / Gemini / Codex session history, runs the full Node9 policy engine, and shows every operation that would have been blocked or flagged.
🔍 Scanning your AI history — what would node9 have caught?
15 sessions (8 Claude · 6 Gemini · 1 Codex) 5,470 tool calls
2,439 bash commands last 90 days Apr 6, 2026 – Apr 23, 2026
Found 168 risky operations in your history
🛑 Would have blocked 3 operations stopped before execution
👁 Would have flagged 162 sent to you for approval
🔑 Credential leak 3 secret detected in history or shell config
🔁 Loop detected 117 repeated tool call patterns found
──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
Your Rules · added in node9.config.json 2 blocked · 157 review
🛑 block-force-push ×2 — Force push overwrites remote history
👁 review-git-push ×154 — git push sends changes to a shared remote
──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
bash-safe · high-risk bash patterns 1 blocked · 1 review
🛑 block-eval-remote — eval of remote download (supply-chain attack)
🌐 View in browser: http://127.0.0.1:7391/
The last line opens a live dashboard in your browser with collapsible drill-downs, per-agent breakdown, and credential-leak samples:
# macOS / Linux
brew tap node9-ai/node9 && brew install node9
# or via npm (any platform)
npm install -g node9-ai
node9 init # auto-wires Claude Code, Gemini CLI, Cursor, Codex, MCP servers
node9 doctor # verify everything is wired correctly
That's it — future agent sessions are protected.
Each shield is a curated rule set for a service or domain. Enable only what you need.
| Shield | What it catches | Enable |
|---|---|---|
bash-safe |
curl | bash, rm -rf /, disk overwrite, eval of remote |
node9 shield enable bash-safe |
postgres |
DROP TABLE, TRUNCATE, DROP COLUMN, DELETE without WHERE |
node9 shield enable postgres |
mongodb |
dropDatabase, drop(), deleteMany({}), index drops |
node9 shield enable mongodb |
redis |
FLUSHALL, FLUSHDB, CONFIG SET on a live server |
node9 shield enable redis |
aws |
S3 delete, EC2 terminate, IAM changes, RDS destroy | node9 shield enable aws |
k8s |
namespace delete, helm uninstall, cluster role wipes |
node9 shield enable k8s |
docker |
system prune, volume prune, rm -f containers |
node9 shield enable docker |
github |
gh repo delete, remote branch deletion, settings changes |
node9 shield enable github |
filesystem |
chmod 777, writes under /etc/, /boot/, /usr/ |
node9 shield enable filesystem |
mcp-tool-gating |
unapproved MCP tools silently activating new capabilities | node9 shield enable mcp-tool-gating |
node9 shield list # show all shields + status
git push --force, git reset --hard, git clean -fdDELETE / UPDATE without WHERE, DROP TABLE, TRUNCATEcurl | bash, unauthorized sudo~/.zshrc, ~/.bashrc)node9 undo to revertWrap any MCP server transparently. The agent sees the same server — Node9 intercepts every tool call.
{
"mcpServers": {
"postgres": {
"command": "node9",
"args": ["mcp", "--upstream", "npx -y @modelcontextprotocol/server-postgres postgresql://..."]
}
}
}
Or just run node9 init — it wraps your existing MCP servers automatically.
MCP servers can change their tool definitions between sessions. A compromised or malicious server could silently add, remove, or modify tools after you first trusted it — a rug pull attack.
Node9 pins tool definitions on first use:
node9 mcp pin list # show all pinned servers and hashes
node9 mcp pin update <serverKey> # remove pin, re-pin on next connection
node9 mcp pin reset # clear all pins
Automatic, no configuration. The gateway pins on first tools/list and enforces on every subsequent session.
When an MCP server returns a 500KB+ response, it sits in the context window for every subsequent LLM turn — often silently doubling per-turn cost. Node9 warns you in real time with a toast and records the event in the dashboard so you can spot the offender.
Every tool call is recorded — command, arguments, decision, cost. See what your agent did, five ways:
| Command | What it shows | When to use |
|---|---|---|
node9 scan |
Retrospective audit of existing agent history | Before installing, or to review past risk |
node9 mask |
Redact plaintext secrets from local session history files | After a DLP finding — cleans local disk |
node9 tail |
Live stream of every tool call | Watching an agent work in real time |
node9 report |
Per-period summary: allowed/blocked/DLP/cost + top tools | Reviewing what happened after a session |
node9 sessions |
Session history with prompt, tool trace, cost, snapshot | Reviewing a handoff or past work |
node9 dlp |
Credential-leak findings in Claude response text | Any time a DLP desktop alert fires |
Plus a live HUD in your Claude Code statusline:
🛡 node9 | standard | [bash-safe] | ✅ 12 allowed 🛑 2 blocked 🚨 0 dlp | ~$0.43
📊 claude-opus-4-6 | ctx [████████░░░] 54% | 5h [██░░░░░░░░] 12% | 7d [█░░░░░░░] 7%
🗂 2 CLAUDE.md | 8 rules | 3 MCPs | 4 hooks
And a browser dashboard that auto-opens after node9 scan — History Audit modal with full drill-down, per-agent breakdown, loop-cost estimate, and live status strip.
Node9 surfaces the signal. Here are the patterns worth knowing:
| Signal | Likely meaning |
|---|---|
Would have blocked ≥ 5 in a week |
Agent is attempting destructive ops; shields need review |
Single review-git-push rule accounts for >50% of findings |
Your own rule is firing as intended — not a risk, just supervision |
DLP finding in user-prompt tool |
You pasted a secret into your own prompt — rotate the key |
| Agent Loop ×50+ on same file | Agent stuck in edit/test/fix cycle — check context or slow down |
| MCP tool pin mismatch | Server changed its tools — review before re-trusting |
| Large MCP response warning | That server is inflating your context window for every subsequent turn |
Response DLP alert |
Claude wrote a secret in its response text — not blocked, rotate immediately |
DLP finding in tool-result |
Claude read a file containing a secret (.env, credentials) — rotate the key and run node9 mask |
DLP finding in [Shell] |
Plaintext secret in ~/.zshrc or ~/.bashrc — every AI session can see it |
These are starting points, not verdicts. One-off signals are normal; persistent patterns are what you act on.
from node9 import configure, protect
configure(agent_name="my-agent", policy="require_approval")
@protect("bash")
def run_command(cmd: str) -> str:
...
Python SDK → · CI code review agent example →
~/.claude/projects/, ~/.gemini/tmp/, ~/.codex/sessions/ — no API calls, fully offline~/.node9/audit.log atomicallytools/list + tools/call JSON-RPC, forwards the rest~/.node9/snapshots/<hash16>/ — never touches your .gitEverything else — config reference, smart rules, stateful rules, trusted hosts, approval modes, Slack integration, CLI reference — is at node9.ai/docs.
Node9 Pro adds governance locking, SAML/SSO, central audit export, and VPC deployment. See node9.ai.
Built with ☕ and healthy paranoia.
Добавь это в claude_desktop_config.json и перезапусти Claude Desktop.
{
"mcpServers": {
"node9-proxy": {
"command": "npx",
"args": []
}
}
}Web content fetching and conversion for efficient LLM usage.
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