Pathhound

An MCP (Model Context Protocol) server that lets an LLM reason over an Active Directory attack graph already collected by BloodHound — shortest paths to Tier 0, blast radius from a principal, the highest-leverage choke points to remediate, and defender-facing remediation text — with every action scoped to an authorized engagement and logged.

Authorized penetration-testing use only. This server never touches a live domain, never collects data, and never runs attacks. Collection is done separately (SharpHound / bloodhound-python); this tool only reads and reasons over the resulting graph in Neo4j. See SECURITY.md for the full intended-use boundary.

What it does

• Turns a collected graph into explainable answers. Ask "what are the shortest paths to Domain Admins," "if I own this account what becomes reachable," or "which edges should we fix first" and get structured results.
• Read-only and scoped by design. It refuses to start without an engagement scope, refuses to query domains outside that scope, rejects write/destructive Cypher, and appends every call to an audit log.
• Defender-facing output. explain_edge and remediation_for_path produce report-ready remediation, not exploit commands.

Tools

Tool	What it returns
list_domains()	Domains/forests in the graph, with node counts and an in-scope flag.
run_cypher(query, params)	Rows from a read-only Cypher query. Write clauses are rejected unless allow_writes is set; destructive/external ops are always refused. Results are row-capped with a truncation flag.
shortest_paths_to_tier0(start, max_paths)	Shortest attack paths to Tier 0 / high-value targets — from start (an in-scope principal) or from every owned principal. Each path is an ordered list of start —[edge]→ end hops.
reachable_from(principal, max_hops)	Blast radius from a principal, summarized by node type, highlighting any Tier 0 reachability.
find_choke_points(top_n)	The edges appearing in the most distinct shortest paths to Tier 0, each with the number of paths removing it would break.
explain_edge(edge_type)	Plain-language reason a BloodHound edge (e.g. GenericAll, AddKeyCredentialLink, DCSync) is abusable, the technique name, a defender remediation, and reference pointers.
remediation_for_path(path_id_or_cypher)	For a path (given as a read-only Cypher query returning a path p), the specific ACE / delegation / membership change that breaks each hop, phrased for a report.
engagement_summary()	Headline counts for reporting: principals, owned, high-value, distinct paths to Tier 0, and the top choke points.

Resources

Resource	Contents
pathhound://engagement-scope	The active scope (engagement id, authorization reference, allowed domains, write flag) and the Neo4j target with the password masked.
pathhound://cypher-library	A curated, versioned set of named read-only Cypher queries (Kerberoastable, unconstrained delegation, AS-REP roastable, paths to Domain Admins, ACL abuse from a principal, …), each validated read-only on load.

Optional write tools (off by default)

Two tools — mark_owned(principal, confirm) and set_high_value(principal, confirm) — set BloodHound's owned / Tier 0 markers (and nothing else) so the path tools treat those nodes accordingly. They only exist when allow_writes: true is set in scope.yaml; each call also requires an explicit confirm=true, an in-scope principal, and is audited. They never delete or drop. Leave allow_writes: false (the default) for a strictly read-only deployment.

Requirements

• Python 3.11+
• A BloodHound CE Neo4j instance reachable over Bolt (the graph is collected and ingested separately — see the quickstart below)

Install

# With uv (preferred):
uv venv && uv pip install -e ".[dev]"

# Or with pip:
python -m venv .venv && . .venv/bin/activate
pip install -r requirements.txt && pip install -e .

Configure

Two pieces of configuration: the engagement scope (a file) and the Neo4j connection (environment variables — credentials are never hardcoded).

1. Engagement scope — copy the example and edit it:

cp scope.example.yaml scope.yaml

# scope.yaml
engagement_id: "ENG-0001"                      # names the audit log file
authorization_ref: "SoW-2026-ACME-001 / JIRA-1234"
allowed_domains:                               # only these may be queried
  - "CORP.LOCAL"
  - "CHILD.CORP.LOCAL"
allow_writes: false                            # keep false unless you need the write-flag tools
max_rows: 500                                  # run_cypher row cap

The server refuses to start if scope.yaml is missing or allowed_domains is empty — this is intentional; there are no unscoped queries. Domain names are matched case-insensitively against BloodHound's uppercase FQDNs.

2. Neo4j connection — via environment variables (or a .env; see .env.example):

export NEO4J_URI="bolt://127.0.0.1:7687"
export NEO4J_USER="neo4j"
export NEO4J_PASSWORD="…"
export NEO4J_DATABASE="neo4j"        # optional, defaults to neo4j
# export PATHHOUND_SCOPE="/abs/path/scope.yaml"   # optional; defaults to ./scope.yaml

Run

As a standalone stdio MCP server:

pathhound-mcp          # or:  python -m pathhound_mcp.server

Register with an MCP client

Point your client at the console script (use the absolute path from your venv, e.g. /path/to/pathhound-mcp/.venv/bin/pathhound-mcp) and pass the connection + scope through its environment. Example (Claude Desktop claude_desktop_config.json):

{
  "mcpServers": {
    "pathhound": {
      "command": "/path/to/pathhound-mcp/.venv/bin/pathhound-mcp",
      "env": {
        "NEO4J_URI": "bolt://127.0.0.1:7687",
        "NEO4J_USER": "neo4j",
        "NEO4J_PASSWORD": "…",
        "PATHHOUND_SCOPE": "/path/to/pathhound-mcp/scope.yaml"
      }
    }
  }
}

Example questions to ask the LLM

Once connected, an operator can ask things like:

• "List the domains in the graph and how big each is." → list_domains
• "Which accounts are Kerberoastable?" → run_cypher with the kerberoastable_users library query
• "Show the shortest attack paths to Tier 0." → shortest_paths_to_tier0
• "If I compromise [email protected], what becomes reachable?" → reachable_from
• "What are the top 10 choke points we should fix first?" → find_choke_points
• "Why is AddKeyCredentialLink dangerous, and how do we fix it?" → explain_edge
• "Give me remediation steps for this attack path." → remediation_for_path
• "Summarize the engagement for the report." → engagement_summary

Quickstart: collect into BloodHound, then point this at Neo4j

This server only reads an already-collected graph; collection happens separately and outside this tool.

1. Collect the domain with SharpHound or bloodhound-python during your authorized engagement. You get a set of JSON files (or a zip) — from a lab like GOAD (GOAD-Light ~16 GB, full GOAD ~32 GB) or a real engagement.

2. Stand up BloodHound CE and ingest the data. The official compose stack runs Neo4j (Bolt on 127.0.0.1:7687), Postgres, and the BloodHound UI on :8080:

   docker compose -f /path/to/docker-compose.yml up -d
   # open http://localhost:8080, log in, and upload the collection zip
   # (Administration → File Ingest). Wait for ingest + post-processing.
   

   If the Neo4j volume is already ingested, you can start just the graph: docker compose -f /path/to/docker-compose.yml up -d graph-db.

3. Point pathhound-mcp at that Neo4j (see Configure) and run it. Your allowed_domains in scope.yaml should match the domains in the collection (e.g. CORP.LOCAL).

BloodHound schema compatibility

Newer BloodHound CE tags Tier 0 with the Tag_Tier_Zero node label and owned principals with Tag_Owned, while older versions used the highvalue / owned properties (and CE also sets system_tags: admin_tier_0). pathhound recognizes all of these, so Tier 0 / owned reasoning works across versions.

Tests

pytest        # unit tests — guardrails, scope, audit, Cypher guard, tool logic

The suite is fully database-free: the read-only guardrail, scope enforcement, audit logging, row-capping, and path/reporting logic are all exercised against stubs, so pytest runs in a fraction of a second with no Neo4j. (The tools have also been validated end-to-end against a real BloodHound CE graph.)

Project layout

src/pathhound_mcp/
├── server.py          # FastMCP app: tool/resource registration + startup guard
├── config.py          # loads/validates scope.yaml (pydantic); Neo4j from env
├── guardrails.py      # read-only Cypher guard + scope enforcement
├── audit.py           # append-only JSONL audit logger (@audited decorator)
├── graph.py           # Neo4j connection + read helpers (the only DB access)
├── schema.py          # attack-edge set + Tier 0 / owned predicates
├── models.py          # pydantic result models
├── cypher_library.json / edge_library.json   # curated read-only queries + edge KB
└── tools/             # inventory, query, paths, reporting, edges

audit/, scope.yaml, and .env are gitignored — treat the audit log and the collected graph as engagement-sensitive.

Safety model

See SECURITY.md for the intended-use boundary and the guarantees: scope-at-startup, read-only by default, scope enforcement, append-only audit log, and no live-domain capability.

License

MIT — see LICENSE.