Hookshelf

Give your coding agent a real webhook endpoint. An MCP server that lets Claude Code, Cursor and any MCP client receive webhooks, inspect the exact bytes that arrived, send correctly signed test events for 7 providers, and replay any delivery — backed by a local hookshelf instance, so payloads never leave your machine.

CI license

The problem

Ask an agent to "integrate Stripe webhooks" and it writes the handler blind. It cannot receive a delivery, so it cannot see what Stripe actually sends, cannot check its signature verification against real bytes, and cannot find out whether its fix worked. The usual answer — a public tunnel and clicking around a provider dashboard — is exactly the part an agent cannot do.

With this server the agent closes the loop itself:

agent: create_endpoint(name: "stripe-dev", provider: "stripe", secret: "whsec_...")
  →  http://127.0.0.1:3000/in/f4080sjvz3v6tfd5

agent: send_test_event(endpoint_id: "f4080...")        # signed like the real thing
  →  { received: true, delivery: "a698af65..." }

agent: get_delivery(delivery_id: "a698af65...")
  →  headers as received, exact body, verification: "ok"

agent: send_test_event(endpoint_id: "f4080...", tamper: true)
  →  { error: "invalid_signature", delivery: "eb7c9d8e..." }   # failure path, also stored

Write handler → send signed event → read what arrived → fix → replay. No third-party service, no tunnel, no dashboard.

Tools

Tool	What it does
create_endpoint	New endpoint with its inbound URL. Optional provider+secret for signature verification, optional forward URL.
send_test_event	Sends a webhook with a valid signature for the endpoint's provider: github, stripe, slack, shopify, standard-webhooks, paddle, telegram. tamper: true breaks the signature on purpose to test the failure path. Fixed event_id tests deduplication.
wait_for_delivery	Blocks until a new delivery arrives — "trigger, wait, inspect" without a polling loop.
get_delivery	One delivery whole: headers as received, exact body (UTF-8 or base64), verification result, forwarding attempts.
list_deliveries / list_endpoints / delete_endpoint	What they say.
replay_delivery	Queues a stored delivery again, byte for byte, pointing back at the original.

Twilio is verify-only: it signs the public request URL rather than the body, so only the real provider can produce a valid signature.

Setup

Two pieces: hookshelf (holds the deliveries) and this server (gives the agent hands).

# 1. hookshelf
git clone https://github.com/vinkurov/hookshelf.git && cd hookshelf
docker compose up -d        # dashboard on http://127.0.0.1:3000

# 2. this server
git clone https://github.com/vinkurov/hookshelf-mcp.git && cd hookshelf-mcp
npm install && npm run build

Claude Code — .mcp.json in your project (or claude mcp add):

{
  "mcpServers": {
    "hookshelf": {
      "command": "node",
      "args": ["/path/to/hookshelf-mcp/dist/main.js"],
      "env": { "HOOKSHELF_URL": "http://127.0.0.1:3000" }
    }
  }
}

Cursor and Claude Desktop take the same command/args/env block in their MCP settings. HOOKSHELF_URL defaults to http://127.0.0.1:3000.

Not on npm yet — npx hookshelf-mcp will work once it is published; this README will say so when it does, rather than before.

Notes worth knowing

• Signatures are generated from the same specifications webhook-kit verifies against, and every one is round-trip tested through webhook-kit's actual verifier — generation and verification can only drift if the tests break.
• Secrets are held in memory only. hookshelf stores secrets write-only, so send_test_event works for endpoints created in the current session; for anything else the server says so instead of guessing.
• A rejected delivery is still stored. That is hookshelf's defining behaviour: you cannot debug a request you threw away. The tool returns the delivery id either way, and the agent can inspect exactly what failed.
• Timestamped schemes sign with unix seconds, not milliseconds — a millisecond timestamp produces a "valid" signature that fails the freshness check, which is the kind of bug this package exists to catch.
• No auth on hookshelf: keep it bound to loopback (its compose file already does).

Development

npm test              # 37 tests: every signature round-trips through webhook-kit's verifier
npm run test:e2e      # 11 checks against a real hookshelf instance
npm run lint && npm run typecheck

The unit tests drive the server through a real MCP client over an in-memory transport, against a fake hookshelf whose responses are copied from the real handlers — and the e2e run then checks the copies against reality. It has already caught one drift: the fake deduplicated deliveries on capture-only endpoints, the real hookshelf only deduplicates when forwarding (there is nothing downstream to protect otherwise).

License

MIT — see LICENSE.