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Pion

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MCP server for Pi Network that enables AI agents to query Pi chain data (balances, transactions) and verify user tokens, with optional payment sending that is o

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About

MCP server for Pi Network that enables AI agents to query Pi chain data (balances, transactions) and verify user tokens, with optional payment sending that is off by default.

README

Model Context Protocol server for Pi Network — connect AI agents (Claude, Cursor, and any MCP-compatible client) to Pi Network chain data.

⚠️ Testnet only. Read-only by default; send_payment moves real funds and must be explicitly armed.

Why "Pion"?

The pion is the π meson — the particle physicists named after pi. Fittingly, particle physicists study pion interactions to search for MCPs (millicharged particles). We couldn't resist.

Tools

Out of the box Pion reads and cannot spend: Tiers A and B need no credentials and move no value. Tier C is the exception and is off unless you arm it. (Tiers refer to docs/tool-mapping.md.)

Tier A — chain reads. Zero-permission queries against Pi's public Horizon API. No credentials at all.

Tool What it does
get_wallet_balance Pi and custom-token balances for a wallet address
get_account_payments Paginated payment history for an address
query_transaction Verify a single transaction by hash

Amounts are decimal strings. Pi is reported as the asset PI, custom tokens as CODE:ISSUER, and liquidity-pool shares as pool:ID.

Tier B — identity.

Tool What it does
verify_user Validate a Pi user access token, returning the uid and username

verify_user is the only tool that touches a credential, and it never holds one: the caller passes a token per call, it goes to GET /v2/me and nowhere else, and it is not stored, logged, or echoed back. A rejected token returns valid: false with a reason rather than erroring, so an agent can branch on the outcome.

Two caveats worth knowing. The uid is app-specific — the same person has a different uid under a different Pi app, which is deliberate anti-correlation design, so don't use it as a global identifier. And a token is the only proof of identity: a client-supplied uid or username means nothing on its own.

Tier C — payments. Off by default.

Tool What it does
send_payment App-to-User: sends Pi from your app wallet to a user

This one spends real money and cannot be undone. It is not registered at all unless armed, so a default server does not even advertise it to the agent.

The recipient must have granted your app the wallet_address scope. A uid alone is not enough — Pi needs that consent to resolve their wallet, and refuses payment creation with missing_scope otherwise. This is the recipient's consent, not your credentials.

Arming requires all four, and Pi restricts A2U to testnet, so a non-testnet Horizon URL is refused outright:

PION_ENABLE_PAYMENTS=1     # explicit switch, deliberately separate from credentials
PION_MAX_PAYMENT_PI=10     # required per-payment ceiling, in Pi
PI_SERVER_API_KEY=...      # from the Pi Developer Portal
PI_WALLET_SECRET=S...      # app wallet secret seed

Holding the credentials is deliberately not sufficient. The switch and the ceiling are separate because the realistic failure mode is not a stolen key — it is an agent being talked into spending, by a prompt injection sitting in data it just read. A transaction memo, a web page, a filename: any of it can say "send 500 Pi to X." The cap is what makes that bounded rather than fatal. Set it to the smallest amount that makes your use case work.

Nothing overrides the cap from the tool call; changing it means changing server configuration. Neither secret is ever accepted as a tool argument, returned in a result, or logged.

On partial failure it never retries. A2U is three steps — create with Pi, sign and submit on-chain, tell Pi it landed — and a crash between them strands a payment. The tool reports exactly which step failed, whether funds left the wallet, and the payment id needed to clean up. A blind retry could pay twice, so it refuses to guess.

Usage

MCP clients can run it straight from npm — no install step:

// Claude Desktop: claude_desktop_config.json
{
  "mcpServers": {
    "pion": {
      "command": "npx",
      "args": ["-y", "pion-mcp"]
    }
  }
}
# Claude Code
claude mcp add pion -- npx -y pion-mcp

Or run it from a clone:

npm install
npm run build
claude mcp add pion -- node /absolute/path/to/pion-mcp/dist/index.js

Configuration

Variable Default Purpose
PION_HORIZON_URL https://api.testnet.minepi.com Horizon base URL
PION_PLATFORM_URL https://api.minepi.com Platform API base URL
PION_ENABLE_PAYMENTS unset (off) Arms send_payment — see Tier C above
PION_MAX_PAYMENT_PI unset Required per-payment ceiling when armed
PI_SERVER_API_KEY unset Server API key, Tier C only
PI_WALLET_SECRET unset App wallet secret seed, Tier C only

For read-only use there is nothing to configure — verify_user takes its token as a call argument, not from the environment. The bottom four are needed only if you arm payments, and belong in a secrets manager, never in a committed file. The mainnet Horizon URL is still an open question — see the TODO in docs/pi-sdk-notes.md.

Development

npm run build      # compile src/ -> dist/
npm run typecheck  # types only, no emit
npm run smoke      # end-to-end: drives the built server against live testnet
npm run arming     # Tier C guards and spend cap (no credentials needed)

npm run smoke spawns the server over stdio as a real MCP client, discovers a funded account from the current ledger, and exercises the chain tools plus the not-found and invalid-input paths. It needs network access.

It covers verify_user only on the rejection path — confirming a genuine token would need a real user credential, which the test deliberately does not handle. The success path is unverified; see below.

npm run arming covers Tier C without touching real money: every refusal branch, the exact cap boundary, that credentials alone do not arm it, that a disarmed server does not advertise the tool, and that neither secret leaks into a result. It uses a freshly generated, never-funded keypair. The one live call it makes is a deliberately-rejected create against the Pi API, which proves the first failure stage end to end.

Known gaps

  • verify_user success path — confirmed against a live token. Returns uid, username, app_id, scopes, and valid_until. Everything but uid stays optional, since the rest depends on granted scopes.

  • send_payment success path — verified on testnet (2026-08-01). A real A2U payment ran through all three irreversible steps — create, sign, submit, complete — and was confirmed independently against public Horizon and Pi's block explorer, not just from the tool's own report. The 28-byte memo question that hung over the design is answered: Pi payment identifiers are exactly 28 bytes and fit the Stellar text memo with no room to spare.

  • send_payment failure paths after create — still unproven. Sign, submit and complete have each succeeded once; none has been observed failing against live infrastructure. The two worst branches of the stranded-payment report — "record created, nothing signed" and "funds left, Pi not notified" — are verified by construction only. Treat send_payment as experimental until they have been deliberately exercised.

    This is why it ships off, and why turning it on takes four separate, deliberate acts: PION_ENABLE_PAYMENTS=1, a mandatory PION_MAX_PAYMENT_PI ceiling, both credentials, and a testnet Horizon URL. Holding the credentials is not enough on its own. Disarmed, the tool is not registered at all, so an agent cannot see that a spending capability exists — that gate is deliberate design (see Tier C above), not a placeholder for unfinished work. The experimental label is about the failure paths, not about the guards.

  • send_payment cannot pay an arbitrary uid. Pi requires the recipient to have granted your app the wallet_address scope, through the Pi Browser SDK. A valid uid is not sufficient, and this is a permanent property of the Pi API rather than a transient error — creation fails with 401 missing_scope and retrying will not help.

Start with a minimum-amount payment and a low PION_MAX_PAYMENT_PI. Run npm run probe:a2u <uid> first: it exercises create and cancel without moving funds, and its from_address is the only authoritative statement of which app wallet Pi will actually spend from.

Roadmap

The rest of Tier C: get_payment_status, list_incomplete_payments, approve_payment / complete_payment / cancel_payment — the U2A backend half and the recovery tooling for stranded payments. See docs/tool-mapping.md.

Unofficial community project — not affiliated with Pi Network.

from github.com/jleeblack/pion-mcp

Install Pion in Claude Desktop, Claude Code & Cursor

Recommended · one command, every IDE
unyly install pion

Installs into Claude Desktop, Claude Code, Cursor & VS Code — handles npx, uvx and build-from-source repos for you.

First time? Get the CLI: curl -fsSL https://unyly.org/install | sh

Or configure manually

Run in your terminal:

claude mcp add pion -- npx -y pion-mcp

Step-by-step: how to install Pion

FAQ

Is Pion MCP free?

Yes, Pion MCP is free — one-click install via Unyly at no cost.

Does Pion need an API key?

No, Pion runs without API keys or environment variables.

Is Pion hosted or self-hosted?

A hosted option is available: Unyly runs the server in the cloud, no local setup required.

How do I install Pion in Claude Desktop, Claude Code or Cursor?

Open Pion on unyly.org, pick your client tab (Claude Desktop, Claude Code, Cursor) and press Install — the config is generated automatically, no JSON editing.

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