Command Palette

Search for a command to run...

UnylyUnyly
Browse all

Proof Holdings

FreeMaintained

One API, all things verified — control, delegation, human approval, anti-impersonation.

GitHubEmbed

About

One API, all things verified — control, delegation, human approval, anti-impersonation.

README

MCP (Model Context Protocol) server for the proof.holdings API. Exposes 176 tools for AI agents to create verifications, validate proofs, manage assets, and more.

Two ways to connect

Hosted — nothing to install. The same tools are served over HTTP, and the client authenticates in the browser when a tool first needs an account:

claude mcp add --transport http proof https://api.proof.holdings/mcp

Or as a config fragment:

{ "mcpServers": { "proof": { "type": "http", "url": "https://api.proof.holdings/mcp" } } }

⚠️ Versions before 1.1.0 predate the delegation tools and the keyless public mode and expose an older, smaller surface than this README describes. If a client is pinned to 1.0.0, upgrade it or use the hosted server above. GET /api/v1/mcp/connect always serves the current instructions.

Local — this package. Installs and runs as a stdio server:

npm install -g @proof-holdings/mcp-server

Or run directly with npx (no install needed):

npx @proof-holdings/mcp-server

Configuration

Variable Required Default Description
PROOF_API_KEY No API key (pk_live_... or pk_test_...). Without it the server still starts in public mode: the keyless tools (account bootstrap, login, proof and delegation verification) work, and every other tool answers api_key_required.
PROOF_BASE_URL No https://api.proof.holdings API base URL

Get your API key from the proof.holdings dashboard.

Client Setup

Add the following to your MCP client config file:

{
  "mcpServers": {
    "proof-holdings": {
      "command": "npx",
      "args": ["-y", "@proof-holdings/mcp-server"],
      "env": {
        "PROOF_API_KEY": "pk_live_your_key_here"
      }
    }
  }
}

Config file location by client:

Client Config file
Claude Desktop (macOS) ~/Library/Application Support/Claude/claude_desktop_config.json
Claude Desktop (Windows) %APPDATA%\Claude\claude_desktop_config.json
Cursor .cursor/mcp.json in your project root
Claude Code Run claude mcp add proof-holdings -- npx -y @proof-holdings/mcp-server
Windsurf ~/.codeium/windsurf/mcp_config.json

If installed globally (npm install -g @proof-holdings/mcp-server), use "command": "proof-mcp" and remove the "args" field.

Tools (176 tools)

Group totals are exact. The tables name the tools you are most likely to reach for rather than all of them — your MCP client's own tools/list is the complete, current list, and it is the one this server answers from.

Verifications & requests (28 tools)

Tool Description
create_verification Create a verification challenge
get_verification Get verification status
submit_verification_code Submit a verification code
trigger_verification Trigger a verification check
wait_for_verification Poll until it completes
create_multi_channel_verification One phone, up to three channels, first completion wins
create_verification_request Create a multi-asset request
get_request_by_reference Look a request up by reference id

Domains & DNS (23 tools)

Tool Description
add_domain Add a domain to verify
verify_domain Check the challenge record and mint the proof
connect_cloudflare Connect Cloudflare so records are written for you
verify_domain_with_credentials Prove control using stored credentials
setup_domain_email Set up sending from the domain

Account, settings & billing (37 tools)

Tool Description
get_platform_summary One-call snapshot of the account
get_usage Quota and usage for the period
search Search across the account
create_account Bootstrap a new account (no key needed)
create_api_key Create a scoped API key
list_assets List verified assets and their proof handles

HITL approvals & consent (22 tools)

Tool Description
create_hitl Create a human-approval configuration
create_confirmation Send an approval request to a person
wait_for_confirmation Poll until a person approves or denies
create_authorization Ask a person to consent to being contacted
revoke_authorization Withdraw a consent

Circles & Proof of Me (20 tools)

Tool Description
create_circle Create a circle of trusted contacts
add_circle_member Add a contact
invite_circle_member Send a single-use enrollment link
create_identity_challenge Run a cross-channel identity check

Public profiles (16 tools)

Tool Description
create_profile Create a public profile
claim_username Claim a public username
update_public_proofs Choose which proofs a profile shows

Templates & webhooks (11 tools)

Tool Description
list_templates List message templates
render_template Render a template with variables
list_webhook_deliveries List webhook deliveries
retry_webhook_delivery Retry a failed delivery

Delegations & proofs (10 tools)

Tool Description
create_delegation Authorize an artifact from a domain you have proven
revoke_delegation Revoke a delegation
verify_delegation Check whether an artifact is authorized by the domain it claims
validate_proof Verify a signed proof token (no key needed)
get_proof_status Read a proof's status by its public handle
list_revoked_proofs Read the revocation list (no key needed)

Sign-in & sessions (9 tools)

Tool Description
start_login Begin a sign-in (no key needed)
wait_for_login Poll until sign-in completes
get_current_user Who the current session belongs to
render_auth_link Render a sign-in link for the user to open

Test Mode

Use a test-mode API key (pk_test_*) to interact with the API without creating real verifications. Test-mode keys are available in your dashboard.

Transport

Two transports ship in this package:

  • stdio (default, mcp-server / proof-mcp) — the server communicates over stdin/stdout. One user per process; this is what a client launches locally.
  • Streamable HTTP (node dist/remote.js) — a remote server that many users connect to over the network by URL, with no install. A connection starts ANONYMOUS — the keyless surface (account bootstrap, login, proof and delegation verification) works with no credential at all — and a tool that needs an account answers 401 with a WWW-Authenticate challenge naming the authorization server, which is what a standards-compliant client follows to sign in. The 401 lands on the TOOL CALL and never on a bare initialize or tools/list FOR AN ANONYMOUS CONNECTION: measured against live clients, refusing an anonymous handshake reads to the user as a connection timeout rather than as an invitation to log in. Three shapes are refused at the handshake instead — a presented token that does not resolve (there the 401 is what makes a client refresh), a request whose credential does not match the session it names, and an opening batch that smuggles a keyed tool call alongside initialize. A signed-in client sends the API key it was granted in the Authorization header — the only place a credential is read, never a query parameter — and each connection gets its own server and HTTP client, so one user's key or session can never reach another. PORT (default 3100), MCP_MAX_SESSIONS (default 100), MCP_SESSION_TTL_MS (default 30 min, counted from the last POST the server ACCEPTED — one it answered below 400. A POST refused before any work happens does not postpone it, whether the refusal is ours (body over 4MB) or the transport's (unparseable or empty body, unsupported mcp-protocol-version, a second initialize); and an open event stream is a connection, not activity, so a session whose only traffic is that stream ages out. The official client does not recover from this on its own: measured against SDK 1.27.1, the stream's reconnect gives up after two attempts and the next tool call fails with unknown_session until the host reconnects the server. Size the TTL with that in mind — it is a memory bound paid for in reconnects, not a transparent one); /healthz reports the live session count.

Delegation (_meta)

The server card (server.json) can carry a Proof of Delegation publication under the namespaced _meta key holdings.proof/delegation:

{
  "_meta": {
    "holdings.proof/delegation": { "token": "<delegation JWT>" }
  }
}

The token is an ES256 JWT minted by proof.holdings attesting exactly one thing: the controller of the principal domain authorized the delegate artifact for the listed scopes. It is not a statement that the server is safe, audited, or endorsed. A verifier checks the signature against the issuer JWKS, then compares principal and delegate to facts it resolved itself — a token copied into another package fails that comparison, because its delegate names the genuine artifact. Details: Delegations — API reference.

When the card is published through the official MCP registry, the same entry is nested under _meta["io.modelcontextprotocol.registry/publisher-provided"] — readers should check both locations.

Maintainers: the entry is written by the fail-closed publish tool, never by hand — from the repository root, after the delegation is minted for pkg:npm/@proof-holdings/mcp-server:

npm run delegation:publish -- --target mcp --token <jwt>
# or mint + publish in one step (needs PROOF_API_KEY):
npm run delegation:publish -- --target mcp --mint \
  --control-proof ph_ctl_<32hex> --scope proof-verification

The tool refuses any token whose claims do not name this exact package with principal: proof.holdings (the same check --target a2a performs against the A2A agent card's own url before regenerating /.well-known/agent-card.json). For --target a2a, if the card-regeneration step fails after the source file is written, just re-run the command — the token is already validated and the regeneration is idempotent.

Verifying someone else's delegation (verify_delegation)

This server also checks delegations, not just publishes one. The verify_delegation tool runs the reference verifier (@proof-holdings/delegation-verifier) over another server's card and needs no API key — verification runs against public surfaces only.

{
  "card": { /* the MCP server.json or A2A agent card you fetched */ },
  "delegate": { "type": "purl", "value": "pkg:npm/postmark-mcp" },
  "expected_principal": "postmarkapp.com"
}

Both pins are required, and they close different attacks:

  • delegate must be the artifact identity you resolved — the package you are about to install, the endpoint you are about to call. Never copy it out of the card being checked: a published token is a bearer artifact, so comparing it against a field of the same card would bless a token pasted in from somewhere else.
  • expected_principal is the domain you expect to stand behind it. An issuer binds the artifact to nothing, so any domain owner can mint a genuine, signature-valid delegation naming someone else's package. Without this pin a verdict would only mean "some domain claims this".

Re-checking everything you already trust (verify_delegations)

verify_delegation answers "is this one good, right now, because you asked". If an agent has already resolved and verified thirty-five artifacts, re-verifying them one call at a time does not scale — verify_delegations batch-checks up to 50 in a single call, also with no API key.

{
  "items": [
    { "card": { /* ... */ }, "delegate": { "type": "purl", "value": "pkg:npm/postmark-mcp" }, "expected_principal": "postmarkapp.com" },
    { "token": "<jwt>", "delegate": { "type": "url", "value": "https://example.com/mcp" }, "expected_principal": "example.com" }
  ]
}

Each item takes exactly the shape verify_delegation requires (card XOR token, delegate, expected_principal, optional required_scopes) and is verified independently — no cross-item state, nothing persisted, and one item failing never affects another item's result. Revocation is always checked (there is no check_status: false on this tool — the entire point of a batch re-check is to see what changed).

Two things this tool deliberately does NOT do:

  • It does not discover what you have installed. You must already hold each artifact's card or token. It has no DNS-pointer resolution and fetches no caller-supplied URL — the same trust boundary verify_delegation already draws, kept narrow on purpose (see src/services/delegationPointer/resolve.ts's documented gaps in the main repository, which this tool stays outside of).
  • It does not run continuously. Each call is a single point-in-time check. There is no cadence, no scheduler, no push notification — call it again whenever you want a fresh answer.

Each result in results[] carries an outcome, one of four buckets:

Outcome Meaning
confirmed_valid The delegation verified — same meaning as verify_delegation's verified: true.
confirmed_invalid A genuine negative verdict: revoked, suspended, expired, a mismatched principal or delegate, an ungranted scope, or a malformed/untrusted/badly-signed token.
no_claim_found The artifact publishes no delegation at all. An absence, never an accusation.
unconfirmed We could not reach the issuer or otherwise get a confident answer right now (e.g. its JWKS or status endpoint is unreachable). Never treat this as a bad verdict — it means "ask again later", not "revoked".

A result also carries checked_at — the ISO timestamp of the moment that item's own check completed, not one timestamp shared across the whole call — so "established locally" is never presented as "established by reaching us, at this moment" without saying which.

⚠️ Release order (maintainers)

package.json declares @proof-holdings/delegation-verifier as a runtime dependency, so the range it names has to be resolvable on the registry before this package is uploaded:

@proof-holdings/delegation-verifier is published BEFORE @proof-holdings/mcp-server, on every release that moves the range. This server is launched via npx by every documented client, so a release whose dependency the registry cannot resolve makes npx @proof-holdings/mcp-server fail with E404 for everyone until the verifier lands. A run of .github/workflows/publish-packages.yml with target: all enforces the order by its step order; a publish by hand from a terminal has nothing enforcing it but docs/runbooks/npm-release.md.

Working on the verifier and the server together does not need a publish. Link the sibling instead:

npm run verifier:link   # cd mcp && npm install ../packages/delegation-verifier --no-save

The test suite needs no link at all: it resolves the verifier's SOURCE through a vitest alias rather than node_modules, so it is green on a fresh clone and picks up an uncommitted verifier change without a build.

Requirements

  • Node.js >= 18.0.0
  • A proof.holdings API key for the keyed tools. The server starts and answers the keyless ones without it — see Configuration above.

Links

License

MIT

from github.com/ProofHoldings/mcp-server

Install Proof Holdings in Claude Desktop, Claude Code & Cursor

Recommended · one command, every IDE
unyly install proof-holdings

Installs into Claude Desktop, Claude Code, Cursor & VS Code — handles npx, uvx and build-from-source repos for you.

First time? Get the CLI: curl -fsSL https://unyly.org/install | sh

Or configure manually

Run in your terminal:

claude mcp add proof-holdings --env PROOF_API_KEY="" -- npx -y @proof-holdings/mcp-server

Step-by-step: how to install Proof Holdings

FAQ

Is Proof Holdings MCP free?

Yes, Proof Holdings MCP is free — one-click install via Unyly at no cost.

Does Proof Holdings need an API key?

Yes, it requires environment variables: PROOF_API_KEY. Unyly injects them into the config during install.

Is Proof Holdings hosted or self-hosted?

A hosted option is available: Unyly runs the server in the cloud, no local setup required.

How do I install Proof Holdings in Claude Desktop, Claude Code or Cursor?

Open Proof Holdings on unyly.org, pick your client tab (Claude Desktop, Claude Code, Cursor) and press Install — the config is generated automatically, no JSON editing.

Related MCPs

Compare Proof Holdings with

Not sure what to pick?

Find your stack in 60 seconds

Author?

Embed badge for your README

Browse similar

All development MCPs