Re Leak Scan

MCP server for detecting publisher telemetry pipeline leaks in binary artifacts. Scans the file's string table for:

• Sentry DSNs (with embedded public auth) — enables forged crash-report submission
• Logstash / log-ingestion URLs — internal observability infrastructure
• Confluence wiki page links — often engineering-only docs / secrets
• Google Drive document URLs — publisher-internal documents
• AWS access key IDs — long-lived credentials
• Slack tokens — long-lived API credentials
• Generic high-entropy hex strings — possible keys / secrets

The output is vendor-neutral: pattern categories describe observable string content, not specific publishers.

Why

The 2026-06-05 stress test surfaced a new attack-surface class that the existing tools did not cover:

• Sample A (GameAssembly.dll): 16,236 Google Drive URL matches — the bulk are publisher-internal design documents.
• Sample B (CrimsonDesert.exe): a Sentry DSN with embedded auth, a Logstash ingestion URL, an internal dev server URL, and a Confluence wiki page link — all in plaintext, all unprotected by the encrypted-VM bytecode anti-tamper.

re-leak-scan fills that gap. It is pure-Python (no .NET, no system tools), works on any binary file, and is the .re-leak-scan / .re-telemetry-extract foundation for the re-leak-scan and re-telemetry-extract skills.

Tools

Install

Part of the RE-AI plugin; ./install.sh installs the package. To install standalone:

pip install -e ./servers/re-leak-scan
# Optional: live verification (Sentry / Confluence HTTP probes)
pip install -e './servers/re-leak-scan[verify]'

Run

re-leak-scan                          # stdio transport (default for MCP)
python -m re_leak_scan                # equivalent

Pattern catalog

The 7 patterns are defined in src/re_leak_scan/patterns.py. Adding a new one is a 6-line dataclass entry. The patterns are all vendor-neutral — they match the URL schemes of public infrastructure (Sentry.io, Logstash, Atlassian Confluence, Google Docs) without naming any specific publisher.

Active verification

verify_sentry_dsn and verify_confluence_url make outbound HTTP requests. By default, they are passive — they only check that the endpoint responds. They do not submit forged crash reports, do not authenticate, and do not exfiltrate the leaked data.

If you run these in an air-gapped environment, the verifier returns verified: false, reason: "connection failed: ..." — the leak detection itself is unaffected.