Safe Code

safe-code-mcp is a local Model Context Protocol (MCP) server that gives Codex or another MCP client controlled access to a repository. It exposes a small set of repository tools, checks every requested path against policy.yml, redacts obvious secrets from returned content, and writes an audit event for each tool call.

The goal is not to make the MCP protocol itself complicated. The goal is to create a narrow, reviewable access layer between an AI coding agent and project files.

Architecture

flowchart TD
    Client["Codex CLI or MCP client"]
    Transport["stdio transport"]
    Server["safe-code-mcp<br/>NestJS + MCP SDK"]
    Tools["MCP tools<br/>policy/list/read/search/propose"]
    Policy["policy.yml<br/>allow + deny rules"]
    Guard["path validation<br/>repo boundary check"]
    Redact["redaction scanner"]
    Audit["audit.log"]
    Repo["repository files"]

    Client --> Transport
    Transport --> Server
    Server --> Tools
    Tools --> Policy
    Policy --> Guard
    Guard --> Repo
    Repo --> Redact
    Redact --> Client
    Tools --> Audit

Available Tools

Tool	Purpose	Inputs
list_allowed_files	Lists files visible under the configured policy.	none
get_policy	Returns the active allow/deny policy, read limits, and audit path.	none
list_directory	Lists immediate visible children under a directory without returning file contents.	dirPath
file_info	Returns metadata for an allowed file without reading its contents.	filePath
read_file	Reads a bounded line range from an allowed file and redacts obvious secrets.	filePath, startLine, endLine
read_file_context	Reads a redacted context window around a target line.	filePath, line, contextLines
search_code	Searches allowed files for a literal query and redacts matching lines.	query
propose_patch	Accepts a patch proposal, scans it for secrets, and returns it for manual review.	filePath, diff

read_file requires startLine >= 1 and endLine >= 1. The server also caps reads using maxReadLines from policy.yml.

Policy Model

Access is controlled by policy.yml.

flowchart LR
    Request["tool request<br/>file path"]
    Normalize["normalize path"]
    Escape{"escapes<br/>repo root?"}
    Deny{"matches<br/>deny rule?"}
    Allow{"matches<br/>allow rule?"}
    Use["allow tool operation"]
    Reject["reject request"]

    Request --> Normalize
    Normalize --> Escape
    Escape -- yes --> Reject
    Escape -- no --> Deny
    Deny -- yes --> Reject
    Deny -- no --> Allow
    Allow -- yes --> Use
    Allow -- no --> Reject

The current policy allows common source, test, documentation, and project metadata paths, including:

• src/**
• tests/**, test/**, __tests__/**
• docs/**, adr/**, openapi/**, api/**
• package.json, package-lock.json, tsconfig*.json, nest-cli.json, README.md
• deployment templates such as docker-compose*.yml, k8s/**, helm/**, and selected Terraform templates

The current policy denies sensitive or noisy paths, including:

• .env* and nested environment files
• private keys, certificates, keystores, GPG files, and credential paths
• .git/**, node_modules/**, dist/**, build output, caches, and coverage
• OS metadata files such as .DS_Store and Thumbs.db
• logs, audit evidence, database dumps, backups, exports, spreadsheets, SQL files, and data files
• production configuration paths
• customer, card, payment, and regulated sample data directories

If a file matches both allow and deny rules, the deny rule wins.

Redaction

Returned content is passed through a lightweight redaction scanner. It currently detects common patterns such as:

• OpenAI-style sk-... tokens
• AWS access key IDs
• private key blocks
• common database connection URLs
• bearer tokens
• assignments containing names like api_key, secret, token, or password

This redaction layer is a safety net, not a replacement for the policy. Sensitive paths should still be denied in policy.yml.

Audit Log

Every tool call writes an append-only JSON event to the configured audit log:

auditLog: "./audit.log"

The audit events include details such as the tool name, file path, line range, search match counts, and redaction counts. Treat this file as operational evidence. The default policy denies *.log files, so the MCP tools should not expose audit.log.

Run Locally

Install dependencies:

npm install

Build the project:

npm run build

Run the compiled stdio MCP server:

node dist/server.js

For development, run the TypeScript entrypoint through tsx:

npx tsx src/server.ts

Inspect The Server

Use the MCP Inspector to test the local server:

npx @modelcontextprotocol/inspector node dist/server.js

Codex Configuration

Add a server entry like this to ~/.codex/config.toml:

[mcp.servers.safe-code]
command = "npx"
args = ["tsx", "src/server.ts"]
cwd = "/Volumes/Projects/ERP-Hub Inc/storeVein/erp-mcp-starter"

After restarting Codex, the MCP client should be able to call the safe-code-mcp tools.

Example Tool Calls

List files visible through the policy:

{
  "name": "list_allowed_files",
  "arguments": {}
}

Read the first 25 lines of a source file:

{
  "name": "read_file",
  "arguments": {
    "filePath": "src/main.ts",
    "startLine": 1,
    "endLine": 25
  }
}

Read context around a specific line:

{
  "name": "read_file_context",
  "arguments": {
    "filePath": "src/mcp.service.ts",
    "line": 120,
    "contextLines": 20
  }
}

Get file metadata without reading content:

{
  "name": "file_info",
  "arguments": {
    "filePath": "src/mcp.service.ts"
  }
}

Search allowed files:

{
  "name": "search_code",
  "arguments": {
    "query": "McpService"
  }
}

Submit a patch proposal for review:

{
  "name": "propose_patch",
  "arguments": {
    "filePath": "src/main.ts",
    "diff": "--- a/src/main.ts\n+++ b/src/main.ts\n..."
  }
}

Security Notes

This project is useful as a policy gate, but it is not a complete security boundary by itself.

For stronger protection:

• Run the AI agent in a sandbox where the real repository is not directly mounted.
• Give the agent access only to this MCP server.
• Keep .env, keys, production config, database dumps, logs, exports, and regulated sample data denied.
• Prefer read-only tools unless write access is explicitly needed.
• Review audit.log regularly.
• Use dedicated secret scanners such as Gitleaks or TruffleHog in CI.

The hardest part is preventing bypasses. If the agent can read the repository directly through the filesystem, it can bypass MCP policy. For real enforcement, the MCP server should be the only process with direct access to protected files.

Project Structure

src/
  audit.ts          append-only audit logging
  main.ts           Nest application bootstrap
  mcp.service.ts    MCP server and tool registration
  policy.ts         policy loading and path checks
  redact.ts         secret redaction patterns
  server.ts         stdio server entrypoint
  stderr-logger.ts  logger that avoids stdout protocol noise
policy.yml          repository allow/deny policy
audit.log           local audit output

Roadmap Ideas

• Add apply_patch_after_scan with stronger validation and explicit approval.
• Add semantic code search over allowed files.
• Add policy tests for allow/deny edge cases.
• Add external secret scanning before returning or applying patches.
• Add per-project policy profiles.
• Add structured audit rotation and retention.