ToolTrust Scanner

Static security scanner for MCP tool definitions
Trust grades (A–F) before your agent calls a tool — run as an MCP server, CLI, or CI check.

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Every MCP tool your agent calls is an attack surface — prompt injection, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply-chain backdoors. ToolTrust scans tool definitions before your agent trusts them and assigns a trust grade (A–F) so you know the risk. ToolTrust is an MCP Server and a CLI/CI tool — not a host, gateway, or runtime proxy. Coverage is expanding beyond today’s MCP-focused workflows; skills and additional agent tool formats are on the roadmap.

Browse the live ToolTrust Directory — trust grades and scan-backed reports before you install.

MCP demo: run a full config scan from your agent.

Scan your setup in 30 seconds

Add ToolTrust as an MCP server and let your agent audit its own tools (stdio transport — no network listener; your host launches it as a subprocess):

{
  "mcpServers": {
    "tooltrust": {
      "command": "npx",
      "args": ["-y", "tooltrust-mcp"]
    }
  }
}

Then ask your agent: "Run tooltrust_scan_config"

It reads your MCP config, connects to each server in parallel, scans every tool, and returns a risk report with grades and enforcement decisions — all in seconds.

Or use the CLI:

curl -sfL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/AgentSafe-AI/tooltrust-scanner/main/install.sh | bash
tooltrust-scanner scan --server "npx -y @modelcontextprotocol/server-filesystem /tmp"

Example snapshot (research cohort)

The public ToolTrust Directory holds current grades and aggregates as scanning scales. One published research pass illustrates the shape of the problem — 207 MCP servers, 3,235 tools — not an exhaustive count of everything we scan today:

Metric	Count
MCP servers in cohort	207
Individual tools analyzed	3,235
Total security findings	3,613
Servers with at least one finding	145 (70%)
Servers with a clean Grade A	22 (10%)
Servers with arbitrary code execution	16

Only 10% of servers in that cohort had a clean Grade A. See tooltrust.dev for up-to-date directory-wide results (and use this table only as a labeled snapshot).

🔍 What it catches

ToolTrust runs 16 static tool-definition rules in this repo (AS-001–AS-011, AS-013–AS-017) plus 2 source-scan rules for embedded MCP implementations (AS-018, AS-019). AS-012 (tool drift) is evaluated in the ToolTrust Directory when new scan results are compared to previous runs.

ID	Severity	Detects
🛡️ AS‑001	Critical	Tool Poisoning — Adversarial prompts hidden in tool descriptions (ignore previous instructions, <INST>)
🔑 AS‑002	High/Low	Permission Surface — exec, network, db, fs beyond stated purpose; over-broad input schema
📐 AS‑003	High	Scope Mismatch — Tool name contradicts its permissions (e.g. read_config with exec)
📦 AS‑004	High/Critical	Supply Chain CVEs — Known CVEs in bundled dependencies via OSV
🔓 AS‑005	High	Privilege Escalation — admin/:write OAuth scopes; sudo/impersonate in descriptions
⚡ AS‑006	Critical	Arbitrary Code Execution — evaluate_script, _evaluate suffix, execute javascript, page.evaluate() patterns
ℹ️ AS‑007	Info	Insufficient Tool Data — Tool lacks a valid description or schema
🚨 AS‑008	Critical	Known Compromised Package — Offline embedded blacklist of confirmed supply-chain attacks (LiteLLM 1.82.7/1.82.8, Trivy v0.69.4-v0.69.6, Langflow <1.9.0, Axios 1.14.1/0.30.4). Zero-latency, no network required.
🔤 AS‑009	Medium	Typosquatting — Tool name within edit-distance 2 of a well-known MCP tool, suggesting impersonation
🗝️ AS‑010	Medium	Secret Handling — Input params accepting API keys/passwords; credentials logged insecurely
⚡ AS‑011	Low	DoS Resilience — No rate-limit, timeout, or retry config on network/exec tools
🔄 AS‑012	High	Rug-Pull — Tool set changed between scans of the same version without a version bump (directory pipeline only)
👥 AS‑013	High/Medium	Tool Shadowing — Duplicate or near-duplicate tool name hijacks calls intended for a trusted tool
ℹ️ AS‑014	Info	Dependency Inventory Unavailable — MCP server exposed neither metadata.dependencies nor a repo_url, so supply-chain coverage is limited and must be treated as incomplete
⚠️ AS‑015	Medium/High	Suspicious NPM Lifecycle Script — npm dependency publishes preinstall / postinstall / similar install-time scripts; severity rises for remote-fetch or inline-execution patterns
🚨 AS‑016	Critical	Suspicious NPM IOC Dependency — published npm metadata or install-time scripts reference a known malicious IOC package, domain, URL, or reviewed script pattern such as plain-crypto-js, even if the top-level package name is new
⚠️ AS‑017	Medium	Suspicious Data Exfiltration Description — tool description explicitly suggests sending user data, content, or conversation history to external / remote endpoints, without classifying it as prompt injection
ℹ️ AS‑018	Info	Embedded MCP Server Detected — source-level MCP SDK usage was found, but tools could not be enumerated from a manifest or live handshake, so manual review is still required
🔓 AS‑019	High	Unauthenticated MCP Route Exposure — embedded MCP HTTP routes expose the same handler without equivalent authentication middleware

Full rule details: docs/RULES.md

How it works

1. Parse — Connects to a live MCP server (or reads a JSON file) and extracts every tool definition
2. Analyze — Runs tool-definition rules against each tool's name, description, schema, and permissions; source scans add embedded MCP implementation checks
3. Grade — Assigns a numeric risk score and letter grade (A–F) per tool
4. Enforce — Maps each grade to a gateway policy: ALLOW, REQUIRE_APPROVAL, or BLOCK

Pure static analysis. No LLM calls. No data leaves your machine (except optional CVE lookups). Runs in milliseconds. Deterministic and reproducible.

Install

# One-line install (macOS / Linux)
curl -sfL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/AgentSafe-AI/tooltrust-scanner/main/install.sh | bash

# Go
go install github.com/AgentSafe-AI/tooltrust-scanner/cmd/tooltrust-scanner@latest

# npx (no install needed)
npx -y tooltrust-mcp

MCP tools

When running as an MCP server, ToolTrust exposes these tools to your agent:

Tool	What it does	Data access
tooltrust_scan_config	Scan all MCP servers in your .mcp.json or ~/.claude.json	Reads local config; spawns each server as subprocess
tooltrust_scan_server	Launch and scan a specific MCP server by command	Runs user-supplied command as subprocess (stdio)
tooltrust_scanner_scan	Scan a raw JSON blob of tool definitions	In-memory only; no subprocess or network
tooltrust_lookup	Look up a server's trust grade from the ToolTrust Directory	Network request to ToolTrust Directory API
tooltrust_list_rules	List all built-in security rules	Local catalog only

CI / GitHub Actions

Block risky MCP servers in your pipeline:

- name: Audit MCP Server
  uses: AgentSafe-AI/tooltrust-scanner@main
  with:
    server: "npx -y @modelcontextprotocol/server-filesystem /tmp"
    fail-on: "approval"

Deployment and security

For deployment, use the install paths in Install or the workflow example in CI / GitHub Actions. For vulnerability reporting and disclosure policy, see docs/SECURITY.md.

Scan-before-install gate

Never add an untrusted MCP server to your config again:

# Scans the server, then auto-installs if Grade A/B, prompts on C/D, blocks on F
tooltrust-scanner gate @modelcontextprotocol/server-memory -- /tmp

# Replace `claude mcp add` with a scanned install
alias mcp-add='tooltrust-scanner gate'

Full gate options and pre-commit hook setup: docs/USAGE.md

Add a trust badge to your project

If your MCP server passes ToolTrust, let people know:

[![ToolTrust Grade A](https://img.shields.io/badge/ToolTrust-Grade%20A-brightgreen)](https://www.tooltrust.dev/)

ToolTrust Grade A

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Supply-chain alert: ToolTrust detects and blocks confirmed compromised packages including LiteLLM v1.82.7/8 (TeamPCP backdoor), Trivy v0.69.4–v0.69.6, and Langflow < 1.9.0. If you encounter a Grade F with rule AS-008, remove the package immediately and rotate all credentials.

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Usage guide · Developer guide · Contributing · Deployment & security · Changelog · Security · License: MIT