Shaughv Health

A private, allowlist-only remote MCP server on Vercel for Emmett and Christian. Their trusted LLM assistants — Claude Code / Claude Desktop, claude.ai (web + mobile connectors), and ChatGPT connectors — can read each approved user's own Google Health data ("How many steps today?", "How did I sleep?", "Why am I tired?", "What did I eat yesterday?") and write the things a wearable can't track itself: nutrition, hydration, and body measurements.

It is a thin, typed, authenticated data adapter over the Google Health API (health.googleapis.com/v4). The LLM does the reasoning; this server returns accurate data with timestamps, units, and freshness metadata on every response. It is not a health warehouse, an analytics product, or anything that diagnoses — there are no medical claims anywhere in the surface.

docs/PLAN.md is the build plan and the source of truth for architecture, the four auth layers, the database schema, the tool surface, the watchouts, and the E2E verification bar. Accepted architecture decisions under docs/adr/ govern their specific scope; ADR-0001 fixes the private audience and Google verification posture. This README is the human front door. Live phase/task status is on the .tasks/ board — see Task board.

---

Table of contents

• What it is / what it is not
• Who it's for and how it's used
• Architecture
• The four auth layers (never conflate)
• Tech stack
• Current status
• Repository structure
• Setup guide
  • 1. Accounts and services
  • 2. Google OAuth redirect URIs
  • 3. Environment variables
  • 4. Local development
  • 5. Deploy
• Connecting an MCP client
• MCP surface
• Security posture
• Troubleshooting
• Task board
• Further reading

---

What it is / what it is not

It is	It is not
A remote MCP server (streamable HTTP) on Vercel	A local/stdio MCP server
A thin, typed adapter over health.googleapis.com/v4	A data warehouse or ETL pipeline
Read access to activity, sleep, heart, nutrition	An analytics or dashboard product
Write access for nutrition, hydration, measurements	A writer of sleep / exercise / settings (absent by design)
Private and allowlist-only (Emmett and Christian; isolated per user)	Public or self-service multi-tenant
A returner of data + freshness metadata + units	A source of diagnoses, advice, or medical claims

The device data path is never live — a Fitbit Air syncs to the Fitbit app, which pushes to the Google Health cloud, which this server reads on demand. Every response therefore carries freshness metadata (retrievedAt, latestDataTime?, isPossiblyStale, note) so the LLM can distinguish "no data synced yet" from "nothing happened."

Who it's for and how it's used

Audience: Emmett and Christian, and the LLM assistants each authorizes. Each person can reach only their own Google Health connection. Nobody else can sign in: the exact approved identities and the decision not to pursue public verification are fixed by ADR-0001, and enforced through ALLOWED_GOOGLE_EMAILS.

Intent — how Emmett uses it. He asks his assistants natural questions and expects grounded answers with real numbers, timestamps, and freshness notes:

• "How many steps do I have today? What's left to hit my goal?"
• "How did I sleep last night?" / "Why am I tired?"
• "Why is my heart rate so high?" (latest synced HR, explicitly not live)
• "What did I eat yesterday?" / "What's my exercise looking like this week?"
• "Log a snack: Greek yogurt, 150 cal, 15 g protein." / "Edit that to 180 cal." / "Delete it."
• "Log 16 oz of water." / "Update my weight to X."

Writes are the reason the server exists at all beyond read-only: a Fitbit Air does not track food, water, or manual measurements, so the LLM logs them through validated, audit-logged write tools. Every mutation is explicit-input-only (never inferred) and leaves an audit row.

Future directions (parked on the board, not part of v1 — see Task board):

• #api — a plain REST API surface (bearer/PAT-authenticated) over the same health services, so Emmett's own scripts/apps can call the data without an OAuth dance. Feasibility analyzed: feasible and additive on the current stack.
• #rlw — a possible future migration from Vercel serverless to Railway (long-lived container); this is the moment the FastMCP question reopens.
• #w11 — v1.1 webhooks: learn when new data lands (subscriber registration, signature verification, a freshness ledger). Deferred by design; tables already exist but stay dormant in v1.

Architecture

                    ┌─────────────┐   Bluetooth sync   ┌──────────────┐
   Fitbit Air ─────▶│  Fitbit app  │ ─────────────────▶│ Google Health │
   (wearable)       │  (phone)     │                    │    cloud     │
                    └─────────────┘                     └──────┬───────┘
                                                               │  Google Health API
                                                               │  health.googleapis.com/v4
                                                               │  ▲ user OAuth token
                                                               │  │  (AES-256-GCM
                                                               │  │   encrypted in Neon)
                                                               ▼  │
   ┌───────────────────────────┐   OAuth 2.1 + DCR    ┌────────┴──────────────────────┐
   │  LLM client               │ ───────────────────▶ │  Next.js on Vercel            │
   │  Claude Code / Desktop    │                       │  (health.emmetts.dev)         │
   │  claude.ai web + mobile   │ ◀─────────────────── │                               │
   │  ChatGPT connector        │   MCP tools/resources │  ┌─────────────────────────┐  │
   └───────────────────────────┘                       │  │ mcp-handler  → /api/mcp │  │
                                                        │  │ better-auth  → OAuth AS │  │
                                                        │  │ Google Health client    │  │
                                                        │  └───────────┬─────────────┘  │
                                                        └──────────────┼────────────────┘
                                                                       │ Drizzle ORM
                                                                       ▼
                                                             ┌──────────────────┐
                                                             │  Neon Postgres    │
                                                             │  encrypted tokens │
                                                             │  audit log        │
                                                             │  webhook tables   │
                                                             │  (dormant, v1.1)  │
                                                             └──────────────────┘

Request path in one line: an LLM client completes an OAuth 2.1 flow (with Dynamic Client Registration) against this app's own authorization server, gets a token, calls the MCP endpoint; a tool handler resolves the app user, fetches fresh data from Google Health using the decrypted-on-demand health token, bounds/normalizes the payload, and returns it with freshness metadata.

The four auth layers (never conflate)

These are four separate things. Confusing them is the number-one source of bugs here.

#	Layer	What it is	Status
1	Vercel account login	Emmett's Vercel dashboard access	Irrelevant to runtime
2	Neon Auth	Neon's own auth product	Disabled — Neon is only a database
3	Google Health consent	Health-scope OAuth; tokens AES-256-GCM encrypted in Neon; done once per (re)connect	Custom routes under /api/auth/google-health/*
4	MCP client auth	This app is an OAuth 2.1 authorization server (better-auth built-in mcp plugin, DCR on); the human login step is Google Sign-In restricted to ALLOWED_GOOGLE_EMAILS	Endpoints under /api/auth/mcp/* + /.well-known/*

Layers 3 and 4 use the same Google OAuth client ID but separate flows and scopes. Layer 4's login uses basic openid email profile scopes only; layer 3 requests the nine googlehealth.* scopes. The health-flow refresh token is the one that gates data access.

Tech stack

Concern	Choice	Notes
Framework	Next.js 16 (App Router)	Server-centric; all API routes on the Node runtime (never edge — needs node:crypto + the DB driver)
Language	TypeScript 5.9	Pinned to ^5: Next 16's build-time type checker cannot load the TS 7 native compiler (see Troubleshooting)
MCP transport	mcp-handler + @modelcontextprotocol/sdk	Streamable HTTP, per-request. Deliberately not FastMCP (a decision — see CLAUDE.md / .tasks/tasks/rlw.md)
Auth server	better-auth 1.6.23, built-in mcp plugin	The built-in better-auth/plugins mcp, not @better-auth/mcp (that package targets the unreleased 1.7)
Database	Neon Postgres + Drizzle ORM (@neondatabase/serverless)	Pooled URL at runtime, unpooled URL for migrations
Time	Luxon	Timezone-correct ranges (default America/Chicago), DST-safe, sleep-crosses-midnight logic
Validation	Zod 4	Tool input schemas; write-tool validation
Tests	Vitest (+ MSW / undici mocks)	Unit + mocked-API integration
Host	Vercel	Canonical domain health.emmetts.dev; Deployment Protection is preview-only (production must stay open — the app brings its own auth)

Current status

Milestone #v1 is complete and live. The .tasks/ board remains the source of truth for future work.

• Production is live at health.emmetts.dev; Vercel, Neon, Google OAuth, migrations, and all auth layers are wired.
• The MCP endpoint, 10 read/diagnostic tools, 5 write tools, and 5 resources are deployed.
• Google Health consent, encrypted token storage/refresh, identity mapping, reads, writes, audit logging, and freshness behavior have been verified against real data.
• The full DCR → PKCE authorize → token → bearer MCP chain is covered by the E2E harness; the core prompt battery also passed through the real claude.ai connector.
• The current suite contains 74 unit/integration tests. Google Health webhooks remain deferred by design to v1.1 (#w11).

Repository structure

.
├── docs/PLAN.md                    ← SOURCE OF TRUTH (architecture, decisions, phases, E2E bar)
├── docs/adr/                       ← accepted architecture decision records
├── README.md                       ← this file (human front door)
├── CLAUDE.md                       ← agent instructions for Claude sessions
├── AGENTS.md                       ← agent instructions, tool-neutral (Codex/Cursor/etc.)
├── .env.example                    ← every env var, documented by name
├── package.json                    ← scripts + pinned deps
├── next.config.ts / tsconfig.json / drizzle.config.ts / vitest.config.ts
│
├── app/                            ← Next.js App Router
│   ├── layout.tsx · page.tsx       ← landing / status dashboard
│   ├── icon.svg                     ← local Google Health MCP favicon
│   ├── sign-in/page.tsx            ← Google sign-in (resumes interrupted OAuth flows)
│   ├── components/sign-out-button.tsx
│   ├── api/
│   │   ├── [transport]/route.ts              ← live MCP endpoint (`/api/mcp`)
│   │   ├── auth/[...all]/route.ts           ← better-auth handler (sign-in, /mcp/authorize, /token, DCR /register)
│   │   ├── auth/google-health/start/route.ts    ← health-consent redirect (session-gated)
│   │   ├── auth/google-health/callback/route.ts ← code exchange → encrypt+store → identity map
│   │   └── health/status/route.ts          ← healthcheck (no secrets)
│   └── .well-known/
│       ├── oauth-authorization-server/route.ts
│       └── oauth-protected-resource/route.ts
│
├── src/
│   ├── auth/           ← auth.ts (better-auth config), allowlist, app-user resolution,
│   │                     state (health-consent CSRF state), token-service (single-flight
│   │                     refresh), token-store, google-health-oauth, auth-client
│   ├── db/             ← schema.ts (8 domain tables), auth-schema.ts (7 better-auth tables), client.ts
│   ├── security/       ← encryption.ts (AES-256-GCM), redact.ts
│   ├── audit/          ← mutation-audit.ts (insert-only audit writer)
│   ├── google-health/  ← typed API client, data-type registry, scopes, and errors
│   ├── time/           ← timezone-safe physical/civil range helpers
│   ├── health-services/ ← shared orchestration layer (also enables future #api)
│   └── mcp/            ← thin tool and resource registration
│
├── drizzle/            ← generated SQL migrations + meta
├── scripts/db-inspect.mjs   ← utility: list/inspect Neon tables
├── tests/unit/         ← Vitest: encryption, redact, allowlist, state, token-service, google-health-oauth
└── .tasks/             ← the task board (see "Task board")

Database tables (15 total): domain — app_users, oauth_connections, oauth_tokens, oauth_states, mutation_audit_log, webhook_events (dormant), data_freshness (dormant), health_cache; better-auth — user, session, account, verification, oauthApplication, oauthAccessToken, oauthConsent.

Setup guide

1. Accounts and services

1. Google Cloud — enable the Google Health API; configure the OAuth consent screen with the googlehealth.* scopes; create an OAuth web client; add the redirect URIs below; publish the app to "In production". Publishing is essential: in Testing status Google expires refresh tokens after 7 days (refresh_token_expires_in: 604799). The "unverified app" badge that appears after publishing is expected and stays — do not submit for verification. Public verification and CASA were evaluated and rejected in ADR-0001.
2. Vercel — import this repo as a project. Framework auto-detects as Next.js. Keep Deployment Protection = preview-only (production must stay open so programmatic MCP clients can reach it; the app enforces its own auth).
3. Neon — the Postgres database was provisioned and connected from the Vercel dashboard through its Storage/Marketplace integration; it is not a separately operated application service. The integration injects DATABASE_URL (pooled) and DATABASE_URL_UNPOOLED automatically. Neon Auth is disabled.

2. Google OAuth redirect URIs

One web client serves both the better-auth sign-in flow (/api/auth/callback/google) and the Google Health consent flow (/api/auth/google-health/callback). Canonical domain: health.emmetts.dev; the Vercel-assigned google-health-mcp-realemmetts.vercel.app also serves. Register all six:

https://health.emmetts.dev/api/auth/callback/google
https://health.emmetts.dev/api/auth/google-health/callback
https://google-health-mcp-realemmetts.vercel.app/api/auth/callback/google
https://google-health-mcp-realemmetts.vercel.app/api/auth/google-health/callback
http://localhost:3000/api/auth/callback/google
http://localhost:3000/api/auth/google-health/callback

Requested health scopes (nine, minimum-necessary — location/ecg/irn are configured on the consent screen but not requested; there is no settings.writeonly):

Read : googlehealth.activity_and_fitness.readonly
       googlehealth.health_metrics_and_measurements.readonly
       googlehealth.sleep.readonly
       googlehealth.nutrition.readonly
       googlehealth.profile.readonly
       googlehealth.settings.readonly
Write: googlehealth.nutrition.writeonly
       googlehealth.health_metrics_and_measurements.writeonly
       googlehealth.profile.writeonly

3. Environment variables

Every variable is documented by name in .env.example. Values are never committed — locally they live in .env.development.local (gitignored); in production they live in the Vercel env store. Never put secret values in code, logs, the task board, or any markdown.

Variable	Purpose	Notes
DATABASE_URL	Pooled Neon connection (runtime)	Injected by the Neon integration
DATABASE_URL_UNPOOLED	Direct Neon connection	Used only by drizzle-kit migrations
GOOGLE_CLIENT_ID	Google OAuth client id	One client serves both flows
GOOGLE_CLIENT_SECRET	Google OAuth client secret
TOKEN_ENCRYPTION_KEY	32-byte base64 AES-256-GCM key	Environments sharing this Neon database must share this key. Losing or splitting it orphans stored tokens (reconnect required)
BETTER_AUTH_SECRET	better-auth signing secret
BETTER_AUTH_URL	Auth issuer / base URL	http://localhost:3000 local · https://health.emmetts.dev prod
NEXT_PUBLIC_APP_URL	Public app URL	Matches BETTER_AUTH_URL per environment
ALLOWED_GOOGLE_EMAILS	Comma-separated allowlist	Fail-closed sign-in perimeter; exact approved identities are governed by ADR-0001
GOOGLE_CLOUD_PROJECT_NUMBER	v1.1 webhooks	Leave empty until v1.1
GOOGLE_HEALTH_SUBSCRIBER_ID	v1.1 webhooks	Leave empty until v1.1
WEBHOOK_AUTH_SECRET	v1.1 webhooks	Leave empty until v1.1

Generate a key: node -e "console.log(require('crypto').randomBytes(32).toString('base64'))"

4. Local development

npm install
cp .env.example .env.development.local     # then fill in values
npm run dev                                # http://localhost:3000
npm test                                   # Vitest
npm run typecheck                          # tsc --noEmit
npm run db:generate                        # generate a Drizzle migration from schema changes
npm run db:migrate                         # apply migrations (uses DATABASE_URL_UNPOOLED)
node scripts/db-inspect.mjs                # list/inspect Neon tables

Local sign-in needs GOOGLE_CLIENT_ID / GOOGLE_CLIENT_SECRET populated and the localhost:3000 redirect URIs registered (both are in place). The dev box is Windows — all npm scripts must be cross-platform.

5. Deploy

Push to main; Vercel builds and deploys. Migrations are run from a dev machine against the unpooled Neon URL (npm run db:migrate), not in the build. Production env-var changes only take runtime effect on the next deploy. Note: an auto-deploy webhook has occasionally not fired on push — if a deploy doesn't appear, deploy manually via the Vercel CLI.

Connecting an MCP client

The production endpoint is live. Each client walks the OAuth flow and an approved person signs in with their allowlisted Google account.

• Claude Code: claude mcp add --transport http health https://health.emmetts.dev/api/mcp
• claude.ai (web + mobile): Settings → Connectors → Add custom connector → https://health.emmetts.dev/api/mcp → complete OAuth.
• ChatGPT: Add a custom connector — it registers itself via Dynamic Client Registration.

MCP surface

Defined in docs/PLAN.md §"MCP surface (v1)"; input schemas per the handoff spec §11. Every read response carries freshness + units and is payload-bounded (default pageSize ≤ 100; HR series summarized via rollups; truncation notes when capped).

Read tools (9, + ping): get_today_steps, get_sleep_summary, get_latest_heart_rate, get_exercise_week, get_nutrition_log, get_health_context (bundle: sleep + latest HR + resting HR/HRV + recent activity + nutrition — data only, no conclusions), query_health_data (generic list/reconcile, registry-allowlisted), rollup_health_data, get_sync_status.

Notable behaviors: query_health_data auto-builds the right filter per record type — including the civil date field for daily-* aggregates, which carry no physical timestamp (a sample-time filter would silently return everything); use mode: "reconcile" for Google's merged/deduped stream when multiple sources log the same metric. get_sleep_summary distinguishes STAGES (deep/light/REM) from CLASSIC sessions (a single asleep block — a device capture condition, surfaced via stagesStatus, e.g. REJECTED_COVERAGE, not poor sleep). Staleness is cadence-aware: once-per-night metrics (sleep, daily-*) don't flag isPossiblyStale for a same-day value; live-ish samples use a 3-hour threshold.

Write tools (5): create_nutrition_log, update_nutrition_log (replace semantics — the live PATCH endpoint 500s; a new data-point name is returned), delete_nutrition_log, create_hydration_log, update_measurement (weight | body-fat | height). update_profile was dropped: the live endpoint 403s despite the granted scope (documented server-side bug); the service layer is kept for re-enablement.

Resources (5): health://profile, health://settings, health://connected-user, health://data-types, health://freshness.

Absent by design: sleep, exercise, and settings writes; bulk historical writes.

Security posture

• Four auth layers, never conflated (table above). The MCP endpoint requires a valid OAuth token; sign-in is allowlisted to ALLOWED_GOOGLE_EMAILS; DCR is open by design (any client may register — safety comes from the allowlisted login, not registration). The approved people and the prohibition on public signup are fixed by ADR-0001.
• Google tokens are AES-256-GCM encrypted at rest (TOKEN_ENCRYPTION_KEY, with key_version for rotation). No plaintext tokens in the DB, logs, or error paths — a redact() helper strips token patterns (ya29., 1//, GOCSPX-, JWTs, Bearer/Basic, Neon npg_) before anything is logged.
• Token refresh is single-flight through an atomic, expiring database claim on the token row (compatible with the stateless Neon HTTP driver); on refresh failure the connection is marked reauth_required.
• Allowlist removal blocks new sign-ins, not already-issued MCP tokens by itself. Immediate offboarding also requires revoking the person's better-auth sessions and MCP tokens plus their stored Google Health connection; see ADR-0001's revocation section.
• Writes (nutrition / hydration / measurements only) are Zod-validated, explicit-input only, and every mutation is audit-logged in mutation_audit_log. There are no sleep / exercise / settings write tools at all.
• No medical diagnosis language anywhere; freshness/limitation notes on every response.
• Production stays open (no Vercel SSO wall) on purpose — the application's own auth is the perimeter.

Troubleshooting

Symptom	Cause / fix
Refresh tokens die after ~7 days	The Google OAuth app is in Testing status. Publish it to In production (Audience page). Testing caps refresh tokens at 7 days (refresh_token_expires_in: 604799).
"Google hasn't verified this app" warning	Expected for this private, unverified, in-production app. Approved users may proceed (Advanced → continue). Do not submit for verification; see ADR-0001.
Redirect URI mismatch / new domain 404s	Every domain that serves the app needs its two redirect URIs registered on the OAuth client. Redirect changes and DNS/CNAME can take minutes to propagate.
reauth_required on the dashboard or in tool errors	The health refresh token failed or expired (often the 7-day Testing cap). Re-run the Google Health consent flow (Connect/Reconnect).
Data looks stale / a workout is missing	The device path is not live: Fitbit Air → Fitbit app → Google Health has real sync latency. freshness.isPossiblyStale + latestDataTime flag this; missing data ≠ zero activity.
MCP endpoint returns 401	No/invalid OAuth token. The WWW-Authenticate header points at the protected-resource metadata; the client should walk the OAuth flow.
New env var isn't taking effect	Production env changes apply on the next deploy. Redeploy.
Build fails on TypeScript	Keep typescript pinned to ^5. Next 16's build-time type checker cannot load the TS 7 native compiler.
No deploy after git push	The auto-deploy webhook has occasionally not fired; deploy manually via the Vercel CLI.
Non-allowlisted Google account can't sign in	Working as intended — sign-in is rejected server-side for any email not in ALLOWED_GOOGLE_EMAILS (fails closed on an empty allowlist).
Claude returns from the browser immediately, then the connector fails	An existing Google session can make Google sign-in silent, so the missing account-chooser page is not itself an error. Use the work-computer OAuth runbook to locate the stage that failed.

Claude work-computer OAuth: browser returns, connector still fails

This is the MCP client-auth flow, not Google Health consent. If the browser already has a valid Google session, clicking Sign in with Google can complete without showing Google's account chooser. The saved MCP authorization request then resumes and returns to Claude immediately. That silent SSO path is normal; the useful question is what happened after the return.

Anthropic's remote-connector guide explains that remote connectors are configured and brokered through the Claude account, with the MCP connection originating from Anthropic's servers rather than the workstation. They can be shared across Claude on the web, Desktop, and Claude Code when the same account and workspace are selected; see Anthropic's connector guidance. On Team and Enterprise plans, an Owner or Primary Owner must add/enable the connector for the organization, and each user normally authenticates it individually.

Record the last confirmed stage before changing anything:

Last confirmed stage	What it means
The Health MCP sign-in page never opens	Check Claude's connector URL, selected account/workspace, and organization connector configuration.
The sign-in page opens; no Google chooser appears; the browser returns to Claude	This can be normal silent Google SSO. Continue tracing the callback/token stages.
Google or the Health MCP shows an error before returning	Investigate Google sign-in, the email allowlist, redirect URI, or server-side authorization error.
Claude receives the callback, but the server records no access-token issuance	Investigate the callback handoff and token exchange.
The server issues an access token, but no authenticated /api/mcp request follows	On versions before 0.1.2, the client may have rejected the malformed legacy ID token after access-token persistence. On 0.1.2+, first confirm JWKS/ID-token verification, then investigate Claude's connector state, credential persistence, workspace, or duplicate configuration.
An authenticated MCP initialize or tool request reaches /api/mcp	OAuth succeeded; troubleshoot MCP transport, reconnection, or the tool call separately.

For the work-computer incident that prompted this runbook, production evidence showed Claude access tokens being persisted after the browser returned. A regression replay then found that better-auth's deprecated MCP path issued an ephemeral HS256 ID token while advertising RS256, omitted the issuer, wrote auth_time in milliseconds, and advertised JWKS/UserInfo endpoints that returned 404. A strict client can reject that response before its first Bearer request even though the server has already stored the access token. Version 0.1.2 repairs that boundary with an encrypted, persisted RS256 signing key and live JWKS/UserInfo endpoints; the work-computer retry remains the final acceptance check. This is MCP client auth, not evidence that Google Health consent failed.

A fresh 2026-07-14 revalidation also completed native DCR, S256 PKCE, browser handoff, loopback callback, token exchange, MCP initialize/discovery, and a read-only tool call through both Claude Code and Codex against production. Claude used a localhost callback; Codex used its 127.0.0.1:<ephemeral>/callback/<server-id> shape. The account-level Claude connector and the separately authenticated direct Claude Code entry were both connected, and the correlated server window contained no relevant OAuth/MCP 5xx or unexpected 4xx responses. A new failure that occurs before any server request is therefore on the client, work-network, or workspace-policy side, not an MCP callback failure demonstrated at the Health server.

Do not rotate shared auth/encryption secrets, revoke unrelated users' or clients' tokens, disconnect Google Health, or clear every credential as a first response. Scope any reset to the one affected connector.

Recovery sequence:

1. Capture the exact Claude error (including any ofid_... identifier), local timestamp with timezone, Claude Code or Desktop version, selected Claude account/workspace, and whether the connector came from Claude's account settings or a direct Claude Code MCP entry.
2. Update Claude Code/Desktop, fully quit the affected clients (including the Desktop tray process), reopen them, and confirm the same account and workspace are selected. Use the latest available release; see Anthropic's Claude Code changelog.
3. Check the account-level connector in Claude's connector settings. On Team/Enterprise, have an Owner or Primary Owner confirm its organization configuration. Disconnect/reconnect the affected user, or remove and re-add that remote connector once; avoid repeated retries that create more client registrations without isolating the failing stage. Re-add it only at https://health.emmetts.dev/api/mcp, authenticate once, and test it on Claude web before checking Desktop and Code.
4. In Claude Code, check claude mcp list and /mcp for a separately configured direct entry pointing to the same URL. Direct local/project/user entries take precedence over a duplicate claude.ai connector. For that duplicate direct entry only, use Clear authentication in /mcp, remove the duplicate, and retry with the account connector (or re-add the direct entry once if it is intentionally preferred). Anthropic documents this precedence and the clear-auth control in the Claude Code MCP guide.
5. Use Claude Code's “paste the full callback URL” fallback only when the browser ends on a literal connection error at a local http://localhost:<port>/callback URL and Claude Code is prompting for that URL. It does not apply to a normal remote return to Claude Desktop or to a callback that already completed.
6. If the failure persists on 0.1.2 after the ID token verifies against the advertised JWKS, preserve the captured ofid_..., timestamp, versions, workspace type, and sanitized /mcp status for Anthropic support, together with the server-side timeline. A valid token response followed by no authenticated MCP request is then a post-token client/connector failure.

For Codex, codex mcp list should show the Health entry as OAuth; use codex mcp login shaughv-health for a connector-scoped retry. Codex registers a public client and owns a randomized 127.0.0.1 callback, so no fixed Codex callback belongs in Google Cloud. If a Codex run fails before the server receives DCR or an unauthenticated MCP discovery probe, update Codex and correct the local model/client configuration first. See OpenAI's Codex MCP guide.

Task board

Work is tracked on a self-contained board under .tasks/ (the SHAUGHV tasks system).

• .tasks/TASKS.md — the board (Backlog / To-Do / Active / Done). Source of truth for what's next.
• .tasks/MILESTONES.md — dated epics; tasks join one with an (ms #id) tag. Current milestone: #v1.
• .tasks/tasks/<id>.md — a rich detail file per task (TT;DR-led, with ## Verification, ## Status, ## Activity). The decision history lives here — e.g. rlw.md (Railway/FastMCP), api.md (REST surface feasibility), inf.md (the infra session), w11.md (webhooks v1.1).
• .tasks/CLAUDE.md — working memory (people, terms, projects, preferences).

The live dashboard is a zero-dependency Node server; resolve its port from .tasks/.board-server.json or run node .tasks/board-server.mjs status. See CLAUDE.md / AGENTS.md for how agents should use the board.

Further reading

• docs/adr/0001-private-allowlist-only.md — accepted private-audience, OAuth verification, and access-control decision.
• docs/PLAN.md — the authoritative build plan (read first).
• CLAUDE.md — instructions for Claude coding sessions.
• AGENTS.md — the same operational guidance, tool-neutral, for any agent (Codex, Cursor, etc.).
• .env.example — the env-var reference.